


REPORT  
ON  
THE SIKHIM EXPEDITION

From January 1888 to January 1890.

PREPARED  
(UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL IN INDIA)

IN  
THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

BY  
LIEUTENANT C. J. MARKHAM,  
4TH KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS.




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
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# REPORT ON THE SIKHIM EXPEDITION.

## CHAPTER I.

To appreciate the causes which led to the Sikhim Expedition, it is necessary to review the political relations existing for the previous two years between our Government and the Maharaja of Sikhim.

*Introduction.* By Article 22 of the Treaty of 1861,\* the Sikhim Chief is bound not to spend more than three months of each year in Tibet. For years back we have been vainly striving to induce his predecessor and himself to fulfil the conditions subscribed to in that treaty, and in 1887, after residing in Tibet for almost two years in spite of our repeated remonstrances, he declared himself unable to visit the Lieutenant-Governor at Darjeeling, because he had been forbidden to do so by the Tibetan Government and the Chinese representative at Lhasa.†

\*For terms of treaty *vide* I.B. Sikhim Gazetteer.

That the Maharaja had no intention of returning to Sikhim was proved by the manner of his ordering the urgent collection and transmission of revenue to Chumbi in Tibet. These acts pointed to the decline of our influence in Sikhim, and seemed likely to force the party friendly to us to make submission to Tibet.

†F. O. No. 1, Jan. '88.

There was one great difficulty which interfered with the re-establishment of satisfactory relations with Sikhim.

While measures were in progress for the despatch of a British Mission to Lhasa in 1886, an armed party of Tibetans, some 300 strong, crossed the Jelep-la pass, and took up a position at a place called Lingtu, about 13 miles

*Tibetan incursion into Sikhim.*

F. O. 293, Feb. '85.

within the Sikhim border, with the apparent object of forcibly barring the way into Tibet. The abandonment of the Mission, it was thought, would have led to their retirement (the Government of Lhasa having made the proposed commercial mission of Mr. Macaulay an excuse for establishing this fortified post) ; but instead of this occurring, they built a fort or gate-house across the road, constructed by, and in the charge of, the British Government, and they showed every appearance of retaining a permanent, though reduced, garrison to block the road to the Jelep-la. Their presence prevented all trade, and was a menace and source of irritation and unrest to the peaceful people of Sikhim, and even to those within our own border in the Darjeeling district.

The Chinese Government was evidently the best medium for securing the withdrawal of the Tibetan soldiery ; but as any mention of boundary was likely to give rise to an undesirable and specific assertion of China's suzerainty over Sikhim, the Government of India thought it advisable to make an unofficial representation in the matter through our Ambassador at the Court at Peking. The Chinese Government were informed that it was merely out of good-will to China that steps had not been taken to expel the Tibetan invaders. In reply, they urged postponement of active measures until they could exert their influence at Lhasa to withdraw the Tibetans from Sikhim. In deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, the Indian authorities determined to suspend action until the 15th March 1888, which date was considered as allowing China ample time to act in the matter.

F. O. No. 298,  
Feb. '88.

F. O. No. 6,  
Jan. '88.

F.O. No. 181,  
Feb. '88.

In January 1888, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal represented that the restoration of the bridge over the Rongli upon the road to Jelep-la was a matter of urgent importance, and recommended that as assistance in rebuilding the bridge or repairing the road beyond the frontier could not be hoped for from the Raja, the Public Works Department, or preferably pioneers, should perform the work. His Honour further recommended that, in order to inspire the leaders of the national party in Sikhim with confidence, preparations for turning the Tibetan intruders out of Lingtu should be at once pushed on. It was now evident that any further dilatoriness upon our part was likely to be misinterpreted both by the people of Sikhim and by the neighbouring States of Nepal and Bhutan, who would consider our long-suffering as a sign either of weakness or indifference.

In accordance with the views expressed by the Lieutenant-Governor, on the 21st January 1888 the Government of India sanctioned the despatch to Siliguri, and thence by the Teesta valley to the frontier, of the 32nd Pioneers fully equipped for service. The de-

*Repair to road advocated.*

F. O.  
No. 188D.,  
Feb. '88.

M. D., dd.  
21st Jan. '88.



Despatch of 32nd 32nd Pioneers at Padong was also sanctioned. Orders were issued at the same time for the clearance of the camping grounds at Sibhok and Reang in the Terai.

The above orders were afterwards modified by limiting the force proceeding to the Sikkim frontier to the head-quarters wing of the 32nd Pioneers. M. D., dd. 31st Jan. '88.

In the meantime the Government of India, with the view of inducing the Government of Lhasa to come to a peaceful settlement of the difficulty arising from the presence of a Tibetan garrison in the protected State of Sikkim and outside of the Tibetan frontier, forwarded a letter to the Dalai Lama, F. O. No. 185, Feb. '88.

Letter to Dalai Lama. In which it was clearly explained to him that we had not the slightest wish or desire to interrupt the friendly relations which had hitherto been maintained with his government and people, or to assume a hostile attitude towards Tibet, but that it was impossible for us to allow a barrier to be erected by foreign troops across a road which was made by ourselves, and over which, under our treaty with Sikkim, we have an absolute right of way.

Previous to this (16th December 1887) the following letter was addressed to the Officer Commanding at Lingtu by the Lieutenant-Governor, under the orders of the Government of India:— F. O. No. 181, Feb. '88.

“His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in India commands me to warn you that unless the Tibetan troops, who have advanced beyond their own frontier and have wrongfully occupied Lingtu in the territory of Sikkim, retire within the Tibetan boundary, a detachment of Her Majesty's troops will be sent to expel them; but in order that you may have ample time to forward this communication to your own government, you are accorded until the 15th of March next to effect the required evacuation.”

This message was not accepted at the hands of the messenger who carried it. There is reason to think, nevertheless, that its purport, if not its exact words, was made known to him and to the Tibetans of Phari. F. O. No. 185, Feb. '88.

Briefly, then, the despatch of an expeditionary force may be attributed to the following causes:—

- (1) The continued and gratuitous infringement by the Maharaja of the treaty concluded with Sikkim in 1861 was seriously affecting our influence over that State. Summary of political events.
- (2) The establishment of a Tibetan outpost within the Sikkim border, blocking a road made by ourselves to the Jelep-la, stopped all trade and tended to detach to Tibetan interests the party in Sikkim favourable to ourselves.
- (3) The refusal of the Lhasa authorities and the apparent disinclination or inability of China to withdraw the intruders.

## CHAPTER II.

The following instructions were issued to the 32nd Pioneers prior to their departure from Mian Mir for Sikhim:—

Tel. from  
D. Q. M. G.  
to G. O. C.  
Lahore  
Divn., 25th  
Jan. '88.

"As extreme cold may be expected in Sikhim, a strict medical examination should be made of all ranks with a view to rejection of any who may not be considered capable of standing continuous hard work and exposure in a cold climate. . . . Ordinary camp equipage should not be taken with the wing: light tents will be provided for men and followers by the Ordnance Department. . . . Followers to be kept to lowest possible scale,—cooks two per company, . . . pakhalis and bhisties as per field service scale, sweepers two per wing, bazar establishment as per field service scale."

The right wing of the 32nd Pioneers under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Benjamin Bromhead, *Bart.*, proceeded by rail from Mian Mir to Siliguri.

On the 7th February the wing left Siliguri, and by the 16th February the Pioneers were at work between Padong (the frontier) and Siliguri, clearing camping places and improving the road.

On the 27th February, the Sa Chu was bridged, and the headquarters of the Pioneers established at Rongli Chu.

M. D. letter,  
dd. Fort  
William, 25th  
Feb. '88.

In the meantime, a memorandum from the Foreign Department (No. 428-E., dated 24th February 1888) stated that the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council "has issued orders for the concentration of the following troops on the borders of Sikhim, within the British frontier, at or near Padong, with the object of advancing upon Lingtu by the 15th March, and occupying that place if the Tibetans have not evacuated it before that date:—

"4 guns, 9-1st Northern Division, Royal Artillery.

"200 men, 2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment.

"32nd Pioneers.

"Wing, 13th Bengal Infantry.

"2. At the present time a wing of the 32nd Pioneers has advanced to Rongli, and has commenced to repair the bridge. It will be for the consideration and decision of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief whether this wing should be supported at once, but the Government of India desire that it may be strongly impressed on the Officer Commanding on the spot that he should exercise the utmost watchfulness to guard against surprise, and that every precaution, whether by means of stockades or other defences, should be taken to secure the position at Rongli.

"3. It should be explained to Colonel Graham, R.A., the Officer selected to command the force, that the object of the expedition is to advance upon Lingtu and turn the Tibetans out of that place, and thus to vindicate our treaty rights in Sikhim and over the road to the Jelep-la pass. He should clearly understand that the expedition should not be pushed further than absolutely necessary to attain the

"end desired, and no attempt should be made to enter the Jelep-la pass and invade Tibet. This instruction must not, of course, preclude him, if he is attacked, from pursuing his assailants across the border, but it must be explained to him that the Government of India are most desirous to confine their efforts to the vindication of their own rights, and to avoid anything approaching to ulterior complications with the government of Tibet or the Tibetans. The question of dividing the force into two columns,—the one advancing direct on Lingtu, and the other to be posted at Gantok, the latter either to prevent the Tibetans raiding from Giantze or Chumbi on the Sikkim villages and to protect Tumlong; or to move against the line of retreat of the Lingtu garrison, must be decided by the Officer Commanding on the advice of the civil and political authorities on the spot, and under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief; but the desirability of protecting the exposed portion of the Sikkim frontier from reprisals must be borne in mind. As the object of the expedition is merely to turn out from a locality in which they have no business a Tibetan garrison who have not themselves been guilty of any hostile action outside of the post they have been occupying, it is to be hoped that their surrender or dispersion may be effected without loss of life on either side, and every endeavour should be made by the Officer Commanding to secure this result."

General Orders, Military Department, No. 169, dated Fort William, the 25th February 1888, contained the following further instructions:—

No. 169.—His Excellency the Governor-General in Council has ordered the despatch of a force as detailed below for operations on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier:—

*Staff.*

Colonel T. Graham, R.A., Commanding.

Captain E. A. Travers, 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

*(1).—Strength of Force.*

9-1st Northern Division, R.A.	.	.	.	.	4 guns.
2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment	.	.	.	.	200 men.
Head-quarters wing, 13th Bengal Infantry	.	.	.	.	400 men.
32nd Pioneers	.	.	.	.	(about) 700 men.

*(2).—General Regulations.*

The organisation of the force will be in conformity with existing rules for field service.

No men should be allowed to accompany the force but those in every way fit for service in a cold climate.

Families of British troops left in India will remain at their present stations, and will receive in addition to subsistence allowance half rations for the wives and children.

*Report on the Sikhim Expedition.**(3).—Ammunition.*

168 rounds per gun, 200 rounds per rifle, and 100 rounds per carbine; the reserve in charge of a Sergeant Conductor of Stores.

*(4).—Camp Equipage.*

Mountain Artillery { Double-fly for Europeans.  
Single-fly for Natives.

Entrenching tools on field service scale, and in addition 100 daos per regiment, 50 per battery, and 50 per cent. for number of followers.

*(5).—Stores.*

One month's supply of Quartermaster's stores to be carried by troops as far as the base dépôt.

*(6).—Supplies.*

Provision for one month's supplies must be made.

Rations will be issued on the field service scale for British and Native troops and followers.

Free rations will be allowed from date of departure from, to date of return to, Siliguri and Darjeeling.

The troops must cut their own firewood, if possible.

Officers will be held responsible for the suitable clothing of their attendants.

*(7).—Transport.*

As far as possible mules, supplemented by coolies.

*(8).—Telegraph.*

The needful extension of the telegraph along the line of movement of the troops will be carried out under orders to be issued in the Public Works Department.

*(9).—General.*

A base dépôt will be formed at Siliguri or at some place conveniently near under an officer to be detailed from outside the force, who, with the representatives of the Quartermaster-General's and Commissariat Departments, must reach the base 10 days before the troops are ordered to assemble; all stores and supplies being timed to arrive during the intervening days. All packages to be made up in mule loads, not exceeding 80 lbs., and marked according to regulations. The base dépôt establishment deemed necessary will be sanctioned in excess of the main force.

All European officers will be provided with a map on cloth of the proposed theatre of operations.

Postal arrangements to be made in communication with the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling. Any necessary provision for the line of communications to be made by the force.

Reports to be submitted direct to Army Head-Quarters, or as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

*(10).—Medical.*

All medical, sanitary, and hospital arrangements will be carried out under the directions of the Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Bengal.

*(11).—Pay and Accounts.*

No field audit office will be established; the accounts of the force will be sent direct to the Military Accounts Department, Calcutta, for audit.

A field treasure chest will accompany the force under charge of an officer to be nominated by the Officer Commanding the force.

Troops, followers, and departments will receive the usual advances of pay allowed by regulations, and the Controller of Military Accounts, Calcutta, will arrange for the provision of the necessary quantity of specie to accompany the force.

*(12).—Commissariat.*

Three Commissariat officers (two for Supply and one for Transport), with a small establishment of warrant and non-commissioned officers, clerks and agents, will accompany the force.

The scale of rations on payment for officers, &c., and the rate at which recoveries for the same are to be effected, as well as the scale of forage rations to those who are entitled to the same, will be found in the "Commissariat Field Manual" and "Field Service Account Manual."

The annexed memorandum details the dates of movements of the troops proceeding to Sikhim :—

*Memorandum,  
Field Operations.*

OFFICE OF QUARTER-MASTER GENERAL IN INDIA,  
*Fort William, 25th February 1888.*

*Dates of movements of troops proceeding to Sikhim.*

Troops.	Date of movement.	Date of arrival at	REMARKS.
		1888.	
Left wing, 32nd Pioneers	Leave Mian Mir, 28th February 1888.	Madhopur, 3rd	} By rail.
		March.	
		Siliguri, 4th	
		March.	
		Padong, 8th March	By route march.
2 guns, 9/1st Northern Dn., R. A.	Leave Darjeeling, 5th March 1888.	Padong, 7th March	Ditto.
200 men, 2nd Battalion, Derby. Regt.	Leave Dum-Dum, 5th March 1888.	Siliguri, 6th	By rail.
		March.	
		Padong, 10th	By route march.
		March.	
2 guns, 9/1st Northern Dn., R. A.	Leave Darjeeling, 9th March 1888.	Padong, 11th	Ditto.
		March.	
400 men, 13th Bengal Infantry.	Leave Allahabad, 7th March 1888.	Siliguri, 10th	By rail.
		March.	
		Padong, 14th	By route march.
		March.	

The head-quarters wing, 32nd Pioneers, will concentrate at Padong, or in advance as may be ordered. The onward movements from Siliguri will be carried out under the orders of the General Officer Commanding Presidency District.

Detailed instructions respecting transport, camp equipage, &c., will be issued hereafter,

With regard to the General Order quoted, the following points require additional explanation :—

(6).—*Supplies.*

The scale of clothing as laid down in para. 233, Commissariat Field Manual, was sanctioned with the following additions :—

M. D.  
No. 84 S.,  
March 2nd,  
'88.

For British troops . . . . .	{ 1 blanket, barrack. 1 coat, warm.
For Native troops . . . . .	{ 1 blanket, country. 1 jacket, Cardigan.
For followers . . . . .	{ 1 blanket, country. 1 coat, warm (blanket).

M. D.  
No. 159,  
April 18th,  
'88.

Free rations were not allowed to the men of the 32nd Pioneers left at the base dépôt at Siliguri in charge of the commissariat stores, or to the public followers at that station. The grant of free rations to the troops stationed at Thal during the Afghan War of 1879-80 was ruled not to be a precedent.

(8).—*Telegraph.*

Under the authority of the Field Service Telegraph Rules, officers in the field can send State telegrams without prepayment.

A. G.'s  
No. 1707,  
March 2nd,  
'88.

(9).—*General.*

The following officers were detailed for service with the Sikhim Field Force, with reference to G. G. O. No. 169 of 1888 :—

G. G. O.  
No. 215,  
March 16th,  
'88.

Commandant of the Base Dépôt—Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Kirke, General List Infantry.

In charge of the field treasure chest.—Lieutenant W. Prior, Bengal Staff Corps, Quartermaster, 13th Bengal Infantry.

## CHAPTER III.

### PHASE I.

In pursuance of the orders detailed in the previous chapter, Colonel Graham, R.A., proceeded to Siliguri, arriving there on the 6th March and assuming command. On that date the only regiment that had arrived on the scene of operations was the 32nd Pioneers. The remainder of the force was either *en route* or had not yet started (*vide* Time Table given in the previous chapter).

*Col. Graham arrives at Siliguri.*

On Colonel Graham's arrival, Captain Mansfield, the Chief Commissariat Officer with the force, reported that stores were being satisfactorily forwarded to the front by means of country carts to the Teesta and thence by mules, and that both wings of the 32nd Pioneers had been sent on with mule carriage.

The left wing of that regiment had started that morning for Sibhok *en route* to Padong; but as no guard had been left over the commissariat stores, it was deemed advisable to order a detachment of one native officer and 25 men back to Siliguri as a protection to the base depôt.

On the 7th Colonel Graham started for Padong, where on his *Arrival of Col. Graham at Padong.* arrival on the 10th he found the left wing of the Pioneers under Colonel Nicholls in huts, and also 2 guns, Royal Artillery, under Major Keith.

The huts are described as of the most flimsy description and offering no protection whatever from rain. Fortunately a store of tents was at hand, which were at once distributed to the troops.

On the 11th March, Colonel Graham rode out to Rongli Chu, a distance of 15 miles, to visit the camp of the head-quarters wing of the Pioneers. He found the camp situated about 400 yards below the point fixed on for the permanent bridge over the Rongli Chu, on *Camp of head-quarters at Rongli Chu.* a level piece of ground about 50 feet above the stream. It was surrounded partly by a bamboo fence and partly by a wall of loose stones.

Immediately below the camp there is a small foot-bridge by which troops can cross, and close to it a ford.

After inspecting the camp and selecting a site for an advanced supply depôt at Dolepchen (a point about 2 miles above Colonel Bromhead's camp), Colonel Graham returned to Padong, where he found that 2 guns, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, under Lieutenant Phillips, and Mr. Paul, the Political Officer attached to the force, had arrived.

*Disposition of force on 12th March.*

The following shows the general disposition of the force on the 12th March :—

Head-quarters Staff . . . . .	} at Padong.
4 guns, Northern Division, Royal Artillery . . . . .	
Left wing, Pioneers . . . . .	
Detachment, Derbyshire . . . . .	

Head-quarters, Pioneers, at Rongli Chu.  
 Detachment, 32nd Pioneers, Teesta Bridge.  
 " " " Rhenock Bazar.

Detachment, Pioneers . . . . .	} Siliguri.
Wing, 13th Bengal Infantry . . . . .	

The total number of transport mules with the force on this date was 1,497, of which 53 were reported sick.

On the 14th March the wing of the 13th Bengal Infantry arrived in camp Padong under the command of Colonel Michell, thus completing the detail of the expeditionary force.

The 16th March was the day fixed on for the advance on Lingtu.

*Date fixed for the advance.* It had originally been intended that operations should commence on the 13th, but on Mr. Paul's request the advance was postponed on political grounds to the former date. Moreover, Colonel Graham considered this postponement advantageous from a military point of view, as, owing to the excessive amount of rain that had fallen, the roads were terribly slippery and heavy, and an extra day or two would give them a chance of drying.

The following were the general arrangements made for the advance. The force was divided into two columns. The first (subsequently known as the Lingtu column) consisted of—

2 guns, Royal Artillery,  
100 men, Derbyshire,  
300 Pioneers,

and was commanded by Colonel Graham in person.

The second, known as the Intchi column, was composed of—

2 guns, Royal Artillery,  
100 men, Derbyshire.  
300 men, 13th Bengal Infantry,

and was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Michell, of the last-named

*Orders for the advance.* regiment. Orders were issued directing the Intchi column to remain halted at Padong pending further orders. The column was, however, to be held in readiness, fully equipped with carriage, to move at a moment's notice. It was also directed that infantry were to carry only 40 rounds in the pouch, while only the regimental ammunition reserve of 30 rounds per man was to accompany the columns, the remaining 130 rounds per man was, in the case of the Lingtu column, to be left at Rongli, and in the case of the Intchi column at Padong (in the event of this column moving). Similarly, the reserve artillery ammunition was to be left at the same places, only 96 rounds per gun accompanying each column.



Disposition Return of the Sikhim Expeditionary Force, Camp Padong, 12th March 1888.

STATIONS AND CORPS.	BRITISH OFFICERS.		NATIVE OFFICERS.		BRITISH WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK AND FILE.		NATIVE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK AND FILE.		OFFICERS' CHARGERS.		TROOP HORSES.		ORDNANCE MULES.		TRANSPORT MULES.		PUBLIC FOLLOWERS.	
	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.
<i>Padong.</i> Head-quarters Staff . 9-1st, Northern Division, Royal Artillery. Left Wing, 32nd Pioneers . Commissariat Department . Army Medical Staff . Indian Medical Service .	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	3	...	...	...	72	...	104	...	3	...	5	...	89	3	...	...	13	...
	4	...	...	...	...	...	318	4	3	...	...	...	...	...	463	40	38	...
	2	...	...	...	10	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	304	1
	2	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	99	...
TOTAL	15	...	8	...	86	...	422	4	13	...	5	...	89	3	463	40	474	1
<i>Rongli Chu.</i> Head-quarters, 32nd Pioneers. Commissariat Department.	6	...	8	...	...	...	364	5	6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	54	...
	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	114	5	52	...
TOTAL	6	...	8	...	...	...	364	5	6	...	...	...	...	...	114	5	106	...
<i>Kalimpang.</i> Staff Detachment, Derbyshire Regiment. Commissariat Department Medical Staff .	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	6	...	...	...	203	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	21	...
	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	192	...	82	...
TOTAL	9	...	...	...	204	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	192	...	125	...
Carried over	30	...	16	...	290	...	786	...	21	...	5	...	89	3	769	45	705	1

} Due at Padong to-day.  
} Due at Padong to-day.

## Disposition Return of the Sikkim Expeditionary Force, Camp Padong, 12th March 1888—continued.

STATIONS AND CORPS.	BRITISH OFFICERS.		NATIVE OFFICERS.		BRITISH WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK AND FILE.		NATIVE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK AND FILE.		OFFICERS' CHARGERS.		TROOP HORSES.		ORINANCE MULES.		TRANSPORT MULES.		PUBLIC FOLLOWERS.	
	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.	Effective.	Sick.
Brought forward	30	..	16	..	290	..	786	..	21	..	5	..	86	3	769	45	705	1
<i>Teesta Bridge.</i>																		
Detachment, 32nd Pioneers	..	..	..	..	..	..	14	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Commissariat Department	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..
TOTAL	..	..	..	..	1	..	14	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..
<i>Rhenock Bazar.</i>																		
Detachment, 32nd Pioneers	..	..	1	..	..	..	42	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
<i>Siliguri.</i>																		
Detachment, 32nd Pioneers	..	..	1	..	..	..	28	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
19th Bengal Infantry.	5	..	..	..	..	..	438	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	42	..
Commissariat Department.	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	675	8	366	..
Medical Staff	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	14	..
Base Depot Staff	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
TOTAL	6	..	1	..	5	..	467	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	675	8	422	..
GRAND TOTAL	36	..	18	..	296	..	1,309	9	27	..	5	..	89	3	1,444	53	1,131	1

Due at Padong 14th instant.

(Sd.) T. GRAHAM, Colonel,  
Commanding Sikkim Expeditionary Force.Examined.  
(Sd.) E. A. TRAVERS, Captain,  
Dy. Asst. Adjutant-General, Sikkim Expeditionary Force.

Part of both field hospitals were to remain at Padong, only the absolutely necessary portion going with the columns.

At 9 A.M. on the 16th March the head-quarters of the expeditionary force, together with 2 guns and one company Derbyshire Regiment, left Padong for Rhenock ridge, arriving at 1 P.M., the distance marched being about 8 miles. At 8 P.M. in the same evening Colonel Bromhead arrived at head-quarters from his camp at Rongli Chu, and received instructions to advance to Lingtam the next day. Orders were also sent to Colonel Michell, Commanding the Intchi column, to advance the next day to Rhenock Bazar, so as to be ready in case any forward movement on his part should become necessary. On the 17th the head-quarters column continued its march to Rongli, six miles, the advanced guard of 200 Pioneers going on to Lingtam and entrenching for the night.

Instructions were sent to Colonel Michell to send 200 men of his regiment to Pakyong, also to forward full supplies for ten days to that place as soon as possible.

It was further decided by Colonel Graham, in consultation with the

Political Officer, to detail a party of 50 men to move slowly, carefully reconnoitring as it went, from Pakyong *via* the Shintingla road to Lagyapla. It was hoped that by this movement not only would the Raja of Sikhim's flight not be hastened, but that eventually this party might succeed in cutting off the retreat of the Lingtu garrison unless they retired beforehand.

Orders to the above effect were accordingly despatched to Colonel Michell, and that officer was further informed that the Shintingla party, if opposed, was to halt and send back word, but it was not to retreat unless obliged, nor was it to attempt to advance.

Colonel Michell was also informed that he was at liberty to strengthen this party if he considered such action desirable.

It would be as well here to explain that the Political Officer deprecated an advance on Intchi itself, fearing that it might result in the flight of the Sikhim Raja into Tibet, leading to further political complications.

On the following day the Lingtu column reached Sedongchen and encamped on a favourable piece of ground situated on the left bank of the Lingtam stream. At 2-30 P.M. Colonel Graham, taking a party of 30 Pioneers, reconnoitred towards Jeluk. Just before reaching this place the party was fired at from a stockade erected across the road. The Pioneers returned the fire, but as it was late, Colonel Graham did not consider it advisable to press the attack, and therefore slowly withdrew. During the retirement a few shots were fired by the enemy, but none of our men were touched. In

Colonel Graham's opinion the party could easily have held its own ; but as indications were not wanting that the enemy was attempting to turn the flanks, it was deemed prudent to retire. That evening all necessary precautions were taken to guard the camp from surprise, but no attack was attempted. On the 20th March the force advanced to attack the enemy seen the previous evening near Jeluk. The following is Colonel Graham's account of the engagement, together with the subsequent capture of the Lingtu Fort :—

From Officer Commanding Sikkim Expeditionary Force, to Adjutant-General in India  
—(No. 15, dated Camp Lingtu, 26th March 1888).

*Colonel Graham's account of attack on Jeluk stockade, and capture of Fort Lingtu.*

I have the honor to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a report of the operations ending in the capture of the fort of Lingtu.

*Strength.*

\*9-1 Northern Division,  
Royal Artillery, com-  
manded by Major J.  
Keith, R.A. . . . 2 guns.  
Detachment 2nd Bat-  
talion, the Derbyshire  
Regiment (Sherwood  
Foresters), command-  
ed by Captain H.  
Wyllly . . . 100 men.  
32nd Punjab Pioneers,  
commanded by Lieute-  
nant-Colonel Sir B.  
Bromhead, Bart. . . 300 „

2. The force under my immediate command, composed as marginally noted,\* reached Sedongchen, some seven miles from Lingtu, at mid-day on the 19th instant.

3. A reconnaissance made that afternoon showed that the Tibetans had occu-

*Reconnaissance.*

piated a position about two and a half miles from our camp, and close to the encamping-ground at Jeluk ; that they had erected a stockade on the top of a very steep ascent, and barricaded the road with a stone breastwork. It was impossible to estimate their numbers, but from information supplied by the Political Officer it was unlikely that they were very numerous.

4. At 7 A.M., on the morning of the 20th instant, I advanced from Sedongchen

*Strength of advanced party.*  
\*Detachment Derbyshire  
Regiment . . . 73 men.  
32nd Punjab Pioneers 100 „

with the force noted in the margin,\* the Pioneers forming the advance guard, with the Derbyshire in support. I further directed the two guns of 9-1st Northern Division, Royal Artillery, to follow us an hour later, their escort of 50 men of the Pioneers starting at the same time as the advanced party in order to repair the road, which was very bad.

5. The advance was slow, as, owing to the dense bamboo jungle through which

*Nature of road.*

the road ran, and also the steepness of the road itself and its many windings, great caution was necessary.

6. On reaching the spot where the enemy had been encountered the previous evening, shots were fired at the advance guard, but were not returned by the Pioneers until they were

*Attack on Jeluk stockade.*

close to the enemy, when, after firing a few shots, they charged with a cheer straight at the centre of the stockade, headed by Colonel Bromhead, who was himself the first man into the work. The place was carried after a short struggle, during which I moved up a section of the Derbyshire in support of the Pioneers. After carrying the stockade, Colonel Bromhead continued his advance for about a mile along the Lingtu road in pursuit of the flying enemy, and then halted.

7. Meanwhile, at his first advance, Colonel Bromhead had detached a party of his men under Captain H. R. W. Lumsden along the road, which passed to the left of the stockade, and across which the enemy had built a stone breastwork. On advancing to within about ten yards of this wall, the party found that the road had been cut away, and that to approach nearer was impossible. The defenders of the breastwork, unaware apparently that the main work had been carried, continued to fire on this party, and I was obliged to send some of the Derbyshire down from the stockade, thus taking them in rear before they were dislodged.

8. The enemy's position consisted of a strong stockade about 200 yards in length and seven feet high. It was constructed of large logs laid horizontally, whilst trees had been felled in front, and formed a sort of abattis. It rested at either end on a precipice, so that it could not be turned; and as the approach to it was up a very steep—in fact, a precipitous—ascend, it formed a most formidable obstacle. The road ran round the left of the stockade, about 30 feet below it, and had been, as above stated, cut away and barricaded.

9. The enemy numbered about 120, armed with matchlocks, bows, and slings; and during the attack many of the bowmen were in trees, and discharged large numbers of arrows, so that it is singular that so few of our men were hit. Their loss was at the time supposed to be about 12 killed and 20 to 30 wounded, but I have since had reason to believe that it exceeded that number. One Tibetan was taken prisoner, the remainder escaping down the hills in different directions.

10. On our side Captain Lumsden received a bullet wound in his left arm, and four sepoy of the 32nd Pioneers were slightly wounded (*vide* return of casualties attached).

11. After re-forming the force, I proceeded along the Lingtu road as far as Garnei unmolested by the enemy; and though here within 1,700 yards of the Lingtu fort, measured in a straight line, I was unable to see the fort owing to the mist.

12. I reinforced Colonel Bromhead by the 50 men escorting the guns, who reached Garnei shortly after I did, and directed him to remain where he was for the night. The Royal Artillery and detachment Derbyshire Regiment spent the night at Jeluk. Their baggage was sent up to them from Sedongchen, but, owing to the bad state of the road, much of it did not reach them until the next morning, and consequently they passed an uncomfortable night. I returned myself to Sedongchen.

13. Before leaving Jeluk, I directed Major J. Keith, R.A., who commanded there, to march to Garnei at daybreak with his two guns and the detachment Derbyshire Regiment, and endeavour, if possible, to shell the fort at Lingtu.

14. On arriving at Jeluk the next morning with 50 more men of the Pioneers I found that, owing to the non-arrival of the baggage, Major Keith had been unable to start, as the Derbyshire detachment had had no food that morning. His own men had fared better, so I directed him to bring on his guns at once to Garnei, leaving the Derbyshire to follow when the men had had their breakfasts.

15. We reached Garnei about 9-30 A.M., the road being very steep and broken, and found that the Pioneers had been undisturbed during the night. It was, however, so misty, that nothing could be seen of the Lingtu fort. A Tibetan soldier, one of several fugitives

who had endeavoured to get past Garnei during the night, had been captured by Colonel Bromhead, and corroborated the accounts which we had previously heard regarding the preparation of "booby-traps" (i.e., large heaps of stones arranged over the road so as to fall on the heads of the attackers). On arriving at Garnei, the prisoner taken at Jeluk was at once despatched with a letter in the Tibetan character, stating that, if the fort was evacuated at once, the defenders would be allowed to retire unmolested, but that an immediate reply must be sent. This man was never seen again, nor was any reply received.

16. The detachment Derbyshire Regiment arrived at 11 A.M., and I then determined to move on towards Lingtu. The advance guard was composed of 50 men of the 32nd Pioneers under Sir Benjamin Bromhead. He had orders to move on very cautiously, keeping men well above him on the crest of the ridge up which the road ran, and on arriving at a point on the road beyond which it was believed that a "booby-trap" had been constructed, he was to halt and await further orders. The remainder of the column followed at an interval of 350 yards in the order shown in the margin.\*

*Order of march towards Lingtu.*

* Order of march of main body.	
Detachment Derbyshire Regiment	90 men.
9-1st Northern Division, Royal Artillery	2 guns.
32nd Punjab Pioneers	150 men.

17. The mist was so dense that it was impossible to see, as a rule, more than 50 yards; and owing to this, as well as to the steep and broken nature of the road, the advance was but slow. The snow, too, which was partially thawed, and which near Garnei was two or three inches deep, gradually increased in depth as we advanced, until, at Lingtu, it lay two feet deep even on the road.


18. The advance was commenced at 11-30, but it was nearly 1-15 before Colonel Bromhead sent word that he had reached the spot in front of which the "booby-trap" was supposed to be. On hearing this I sent him orders to leave the road and advance straight up the ridge (intending thus to get behind the trap), while at the same time I sent forward the Derbyshire, a section at a time, at intervals of 100 yards, to his support up the same ridge from a point below. On leaving the road, the ascent became precipitous, and the snow very deep; but the men pressed on eagerly, anxious to reach the summit.

19. At about 1-30 P.M. I heard the bugle of the 32nd Pioneers sound the charge, but without any firing; and word arrived from Colonel Bromhead that he had reached the gate of the fort, and, finding it open, had charged through it. When he entered, the place was occupied by some 30 Tibetans, who fled at his approach along the Gnathong road. A party of the 32nd Pioneers was at once despatched along the Gnathong road, and proceeded some two miles in that direction, but without finding any trace of the enemy.

20. Although the fort of Lingtu was thus occupied without resistance, I desire to bring to His Excellency's notice the behaviour of the troops during this most trying march. They, one and all, made light of the discomforts to which they were subjected, and vied with one another in their anxiety to come to close quarters with the enemy. Both then and since they have had to put up with many privations, due to the wet and cold, as well as to the bad state of the roads and the high altitude (12,600 feet above the sea); but they have been at all times in the best of spirits, and anxious to make light of their troubles.



No 1.—Sketch to accompany Note by D. Q. M. G., dated 1st December 1887.







21. I am especially indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Benjamin Bromhead, Bart., 32nd Pioneers, both for the way in which he led his men, both at Jeluk and during the march on Lingtu, and also for the admirable manner in which he carried out the duties of commander of the advance-guard during the march from the Rongli river to Jeluk.

22. Colonel Bromhead has brought to my notice the plucky way in which Captain H.R.W. Lumsden led his men at the attack on Jeluk, and of this I was myself also a witness; and he also mentions the marginally noted\* men of his regiment as having been particularly forward during the assault.

\* Lance Naick Jowahir Singh, A Company.  
Sepoy Nutha Singh, F Company.  
Sepoy Sahib Singh, A Company.

† No. 1956 Color Sergeant Thomas Collins.  
No. 745 Corporal Thomas McCullough.

23. The marginally noted† men of the Derbyshire Regiment also distinguished themselves during the attack on Jeluk.

24. I also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the following officers, viz.—  
Captain E. A. Travers, 1st Battalion, 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Gurkhas, has not only been of the greatest assistance to me as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the Force, but during the attack on the stockade at Jeluk he was into the work immediately after the leading party, and was most useful in collecting the men who had become scattered during the attack, and in directing the turning movement against the men in the breastwork on the road.

Lieutenant E. Bickford, R.A., my Orderly Officer, was also well to the front, and was most useful in keeping me informed of all that was going on during the attack, it being impossible for me, owing to the thickness of the jungle, to see more than a few yards.

25. In conclusion, I would desire to place on record my indebtedness to Mr. A. W. Paul, Bengal Civil Service, the Political Officer with the Force, owing to whose exertions and personal popularity with the people of the country we have at all times been plentifully supplied with coolies (without which it would have been impossible to advance), and by whom I have myself been at all times provided with the most accurate information. To Mr. Paul's Assistant, Tendoop Pulger, I would also offer my best thanks. His local knowledge has been at times invaluable, especially during the advance on Lingtu fort, when, by means of his assistance, we were able to avoid the spot where, as we found on our arrival, the enemy had placed large boulders above the road.

### 32ND REGIMENT OF PIONEERS.

*Return of Casualties in action at Feluk (Sikkim) on 20th March 1888.*

#### SUMMARY.

Officers—Killed nil; wounded, 1; missing, nil.

Non-commissioned Officers and men—Killed nil; wounded, 4; missing nil.

*Nominal return of Officers,*

*Killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
	Nil.	

*Wounded.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
Captain	H. R. W. Lumsden	Slight	Gunshot wound through flesh, and much of left upper arm.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men,**Killed.*


Regtl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>	

*Wounded.*

Regtl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
2331	Sepoy	Jagat Singh	Slight	Gunshot wound through flesh, left upper arm.
1531	Sepoy	Jawala Singh	Slight	Contusion on forehead by a stone.
1664	Sepoy	Buta Singh	Slight	Contusion on leg above knee by a stone.
1766	Sepoy	Gurdit Singh	Slight	Arrow wound on knuckle.

The following is Colonel Graham's description of the captured fort :—

"The fort (so-called) consists of a straight wall of loose stones some four feet thick and about 240 yards in length. Its average height is about 12 feet, but as it is built in steps, thus



it is in places much lower. There is a round tower some 15 feet high and 12 feet in diameter at each end of the wall, and in the centre of the wall there is a wooden doorway through which the road runs. There are loopholes in the wall about every 20 feet, but they are so badly constructed that the fire from them would have but little effect, and there is no banquette of any kind, so that it would have been impossible for the defenders to fire over the top of the wall. There is complete

cover to within a few yards of the wall at several points, and the wall itself does not extend to within some 20 yards of the top of the hill, so that had resistance been offered, there would not have been the slightest difficulty in taking the work. There is one detached tower about 200 to 300 yards off the walls, the same size as those at the end of the wall. The place is hardly worthy the name of a fort, as it is quite incapable of defence."

The fort having been captured, the Derbyshire and Pioneers were directed to occupy the barracks built by the Tibetans, which afforded ample accommodation for both; Colonel Graham, however, returned to Garnei, which was more centrally situated. So quickly had the capture of the fort been effected that the guns had been unable to arrive in time to take part in the attack. Consequently they were halted about  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile from the gate, and were subsequently ordered back to Garnei, there being no forage available at Lingtu, and the only water procurable being melted snow. With the exception of a considerable quantity of tobacco, nothing of the slightest value was found in the fort.

Whilst the Lingtu column was engaged as above narrated, the  
*Intchi Column.* Intchi column, in obedience to the orders previously detailed, advanced on the 17th March to Rhenock Bazar. From here 200 Pioneers under Captain Fairbrother were pushed on to Pakyong, where they arrived on the 19th. From Pakyong a party of 50 men under Lieutenant Davidson was directed to move on Lagyapla *via* the Shintingla road. This party had reached Jongchin on the 23rd March, when it was recalled agreeably to orders received from head-quarters.

## CHAPTER IV.

### PHASE II.

In the previous chapter we have seen that the main object of the expedition, *vis.*, the expulsion of the Tibetans from the Sikhim Raja's territory, had now been effected. It remained for Colonel Graham to make the necessary dispositions to protect the exposed portion of the Sikhim frontier from reprisals. Probably from a purely military point of view the most effectual means of gaining this end would have been to carry the war into the enemy's country, and by the infliction of a severe defeat or defeats compel him to sue for peace on our own terms. But such a course would have led to complications with the Tibetan Government, and possibly with that of China also. It was therefore deemed advisable to limit the operations, as far as possible, to the Sikhim territory, no advance into Thibet being permitted except in the case of a pursuit after a defeated attack.

M. D. letter,  
 Fort William,  
 25th Feb. '88.

On the 24th March Government telegraphed the following order to the Officer Commanding at Sikhim:—

M. D. Tel.  
No. 142 S.,  
24th March  
'88.

*Instructions to Colonel Graham.* "The defences of Lingtu should be demolished and the road repaired. The artillery can be withdrawn to Darjeeling, but no further reduction of the force should be made at present without orders.

"The main body should temporarily take up such a position as will prevent any re-occupation of Lingtu by the Tibetans, and will be convenient for the health and security of the troops. If possible, this position should be chosen so that it may hereafter, if necessary, be occupied by a detachment for a few months to control the road and prevent the re-occupation of Lingtu by the Tibetans. The Officer Commanding should choose this position in concert with Mr. Paul, and in consultation with him should report on the composition and strength of the detachment necessary for this purpose, how it is to be supported, and what transport should be retained.

"It is understood that the Tibetans have re-crossed the frontier. If this is not the case, and they have occupied any point within Sikhim, they should be driven out of it, provided practical military considerations permit of this being done. This in no way modifies the original instructions that the frontier is not to be crossed unless our force is attacked, and it is necessary to pursue the assailants across the border."

Prior to the receipt of these orders the demolition of the Lingtu defences had already been commenced under Colonel Graham's orders, and the work was completed on the 25th March.

The Quartermaster-General, in his letter No. 209 F. C., dated 1st March, had already instructed Colonel Graham that after the capture of Lingtu he was to take up the question of protecting the exposed portion of the frontier of Sikhim from reprisals. It now remained for him to select suitable positions for this purpose, and to submit his proposals to Government.

The selection of a site was somewhat delayed owing to the roads being more or less blocked with snow, but eventually Gnathong was fixed on.

In the following letter Colonel Graham discusses the whole question of the location of the troops in Sikhim, and submits his recommendations to Government. The letter is of such importance to the proper understanding of the question, that it is given *in extenso*:—

From COLONEL T. GRAHAM, Commanding Sikhim Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster-General in India,—(No. 27, dated Camp Gnathong, 14th April 1888).

Agreeably to the instructions contained in your letter No. 209 F.C., of the 1st ultimo, paragraphs 5 and 6, which direct that I should submit proposals regarding

the force to remain in Sikkim, with a view to the protection of that country from any hostilities on the part of the Tibetans, and also regarding the hutting of the force which I recommend to remain, I have the honor to forward the following remarks for submission to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. I presume that Government does not contemplate retaining in Sikkim the whole of the expeditionary force, as at present constituted, beyond the end of May. Should it, however, be under consideration to keep all the troops here during the rains, I would beg to point out the desirability of my being informed as soon as possible, as owing to the heavy rainfall in this district it will be necessary to at once commence hutting the troops. Moreover, as during the months of June, July, August, September and October, it will be a work of the greatest difficulty to forward supplies to the force, it would be necessary to at once forward provisions for at least five months in addition to those already sanctioned (*vis.*, to the end of May). In the event, however, of this course being decided upon, such special arrangements regarding the hutting, &c., &c., of the troops would be necessary that I prefer to leave them to be dealt with, if required, in a separate letter.

3. Setting aside, then, the question of the whole force remaining in Sikkim, it appears to me that the subject of the garrison to be left in the country has to be considered under two aspects, *vis.* :—

- (1) In the event of a satisfactory agreement having been concluded with Tibet.
- (2) In the event of the Tibetan authorities continuing their present line of conduct and declining to open negotiations.

I propose, first, to consider the second alternative, as the force necessary in this case will, of course, suffice to meet the first case also.

4. I am informed by the Political Officer that the armed force of Tibet consists, when they are acting independently of China, as *Strength.* would presumably be the case against us, of some four thousand men. These are badly armed and poorly disciplined, but having in view their numerical strength, I do not consider that it would be desirable to leave behind a smaller force than a battalion of Native Infantry of a strength of eight hundred men. A smaller force than this would, no doubt, be able to maintain itself in a fortified enclosure against any force which the Tibetans could get together; but it would be liable to be placed in a position which it is obviously undesirable that any British force should occupy, by being practically besieged and unable to move outside its entrenchments. A force of eight hundred men, however, would, I think, be able not only to maintain its position, but at the same time to send out a sufficient force to keep the enemy at a distance, and to prevent itself being subjected to petty annoyances; it would be able, in fact, to make itself respected to a considerable distance from its camp. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that it is most important that it should not become necessary to send a force to the assistance of the garrison during the next six months, as any movement of troops in these hills during the rainy season would be attended by the greatest difficulties.

5. I am induced to recommend that the garrison should consist of Native Infantry only for the following reasons :—

*Native garrison instead of Europeans.*

- (1) I consider it most desirable that a complete unit should be left here not only on the grounds of discipline and efficiency, but also because it will much simplify medical, commissariat and other arrangements;

and this could not be done if British as well as Native troops were employed, as anything beyond eight hundred men is unnecessary.

- (2) I consider that Native troops, without the assistance of European troops, are sufficient to keep the Tibetans in check ; in other words, the moral effect of the presence of Europeans is not required. In this view the Political Officer concurs.
- (3) It is far easier to arrange for native supplies than it is for those of European troops.

It was, I consider, most desirable that European troops, and especially artillery, should have been employed in the first instance ; but now that the primary objects of the expedition have been accomplished, I do not think that the advantages which would accrue from employing them compensate for the increased difficulties which their presence would cause, at any rate, when no forward movement is in contemplation.

6. As regards the location of the force, I consider that the position at present

*Location.*

occupied by the force under my command, on the ridge just above the Gnathong stream, is in every way the most suitable one which can be selected. It completely commands the road into Tibet over the Jelep pass, and also another road which crosses a pass to the east of the Jelep and debouches into Tibet near the village of Rin-chingong ; it is easily defensible ; wood is obtainable in abundance ; the supply of water is good, plentiful, close at hand, commanded by the position, and cannot be tampered with ; it is sheltered by the neighbouring hills, and the temperature is much warmer than that of most places in the neighbourhood ; whilst the site which I have selected is well drained and should, in the opinion of the senior medical officer, prove a healthy one. As, however, little or no forage is obtainable at Gnathong, and I consider it most desirable, for reasons given below, that a certain amount of transport should be kept with the garrison, I would propose that two hundred men should remain with the mules at Shalambi, a place one mile from Lingtu and two miles and-a-half from Gnathong. There is here an abundant supply of bamboo forage close at hand, a perfectly sheltered spot where sheds for the mules could be erected, and an entrenchment of sufficient size for the proposed force already exists ; whilst the position also has the advantage of commanding the road leading from Lingtu into Bhutan. The force at Shalambi could, if necessary, reach Gnathong in two or three hours. I do not consider it necessary to station any troops on the line of communications ; the presence of troops at Gnathong would, I believe, be sufficient to keep the road open. With a force located as I propose, it would be impossible for the Tibetans to re-occupy Lingtu, whilst any Tibetan army invading Sikhim by the Jelep or any more western pass would feel that its line of retreat was seriously threatened. I would not propose that any troops should remain at Lingtu itself ; the place is much exposed and the water-supply at a distance, whilst I am aware of no compensating advantage that would be gained by its occupation.

7. As regards the question of supplies, I would recommend that sufficient to

*Supplies.*

last up to the end of October be at once forwarded to Gnathong. Government carriage is at present available, and the whole could be conveyed to Gnathong by the 15th May, up to which date fine weather may reasonably be expected. The alternative course of sending out supplies from time to time from Darjeeling would not only be much more expensive, but would, owing to the rain, be a matter of difficulty ; whilst the supplies themselves would probably be damaged by wet, and their punctual arrival could not be depended on.

8. That the garrison should possess mobility is, I consider, essential; without

*Transport.*

this it would be unable to repel any incursion into Sikkim or to make its influence felt at any distance from its encampment; whilst the knowledge that distance did not ensure immunity from attack would doubtless have a deterrent effect on any hostile schemes of the Tibetans. If transport sufficient to move the whole force with two days' supplies, and a certain proportion of ammunition, tents, &c., were maintained, it would, I think, be all that is required. Two hundred and fifty mules would suffice for this.

*Ammunition.*

9. The supply of ammunition should be completed to four hundred rounds per rifle.

10. If a regiment of Pioneers is left here, the men can easily hut themselves before the rains begin. If another regiment is detailed, it would be necessary to supply them with tools

*Hutting.*

and to assist them with local coolie labour. An abundant supply of wood exists within a short distance of camp.

11. Postal arrangements and also arrangements for sending up any small extra supplies required could be carried out by the local authorities at Darjeeling.

*Postal arrangements.*

12. I would suggest that the present 'down country' *kahar* be replaced by coolies, as far as the hospital of the permanent garrison is concerned, as the former is of little use in this

*Dooly-bearers.*

climate. There would be no difficulty in procuring these at any rate during the summer months.

13. In the event of troops remaining in Sikkim under the first of the conditions

*Strength of force after conclusion of agreement with Tibet.*

enumerated in paragraph 3 of this letter, the question of the strength of the force becomes so much a political one, depending as it does upon the amount of confidence which Government are prepared to place in Tibetan promises and guarantees, that it is hardly within my province to offer an opinion. I should consider, however, that half the number of troops suggested above would be sufficient; this would secure the garrison against any petty raids at the hands of the Tibetan authorities of the frontier districts, whose views towards us might not be in harmony with those of the rulers at Lhasa.

14. I may add that Mr. Paul, the Political Officer, has seen this letter, and

*Political Officer.*

approves generally of the proposals contained herein.

In forwarding the above letter to Government, the Commander-in-

*Recommendations of Commander-in-Chief.*

Chief stated that he approved of Colonel Graham's proposals, but that he did not think any diminution of the expeditionary force should take place at present, but that the European portion should be withdrawn before the rains commenced. If by that time the Tibetans had not given in, His Excellency proposed to leave 800 Native infantry in the country. If, however, the Tibetans came to terms, probably one-half the above would be sufficient.

In its letter No. 168 S., dated 30th April, the Government of India expressed its concurrence in the views of the Commander-in-Chief, and sanctioned the erection.

*Concurrence of Government.*

tion of huts for the 32nd Pioneers and the necessary shelter for the transport establishments on the sites proposed by Colonel Graham.

Government further instructed the Commissary General to forward full supplies for five months for a Native regiment to the selected camp, and to place 250 mules at Colonel Graham's disposal.

Subsequently, however, Government directed that the instructions conveyed in the above-quoted letter for the withdrawal of a part of the force before the rains set in should be held in abeyance pending receipt of further orders. The Commissary General was also ordered to forward at once supplies for the whole force sufficient to last to the end of June, and for the 32nd Pioneers and 250 mules for a period of four months from the 1st July.

Having thus briefly explained the orders of Government, we will return to the doings of the troops after the capture of Lingtu.

For some days after that event the men were chiefly employed in improving the communications and their own hutting accommodation. It had at first been intended to utilize the Tibetan barracks at Lingtu for our men, but they were found to be so close and ill-ventilated that Colonel Graham eventually decided to move all the troops out of them with the exception of 50 Pioneers. This was done on the 25th March.

On the 24th March Colonel Graham and Mr. Paul, with an escort of the Derbyshire, made an attempt to reach Gnathong to ascertain if a suitable spot could be found there for the location of troops. They advanced as far as Chambok Pokri, where they were met by two of Mr. Paul's men, who reported they had been as far as Gnathong, and that a mile on this side of that place

*Snow at Gnathong.* the snow was lying four or five feet deep. As snow had commenced falling and it was obviously impossible to locate troops there at present, the party returned to camp. Colonel Graham now decided to remove the main body of his column to Sedongchen, leaving a party of 50 Pioneers under a British officer as a garrison at Lingtu. This movement was, however, postponed at Mr. Paul's request, but 150 Pioneers were ordered to Garnei on the 26th for work on the road.

Having previously received information from Mr. Paul that the road to Gnathong was rapidly clearing, Colonel Graham with an escort of the Derbyshire proceeded there on the 27th March.

The road was found to require but little repair. At Gnathong itself there was not much snow and that rapidly melting.

Ample room was available to encamp a large force with an abundant and excellent supply of water. Forage, however, was scarce; beyond stunted grass, on which during a halt animals might graze, none was seen. There



were no signs of the Tibetans, but rumours of a large gathering at Chumbi reached the party.

The following statement shows the distribution of the force on the 28th March :—

LINGTU.

Head-quarters Staff: 4 officers.

Detachment, Derbyshire: 3 officers, 101 men.

32nd Pioneers: British officers 4, Natives 200.

JELUK.

Staff Officer, 1.

Pioneers: Officer 1, Natives 70.

SEDONGCHEN.

Royal Artillery { 2 officers, 38 men (British).  
Natives 52.

32nd Pioneers: 20 men.

RONGLI.

Detachment, 32nd Pioneers: 1 British officer.  
200 Natives.

DOLEPCHEN.

Detachment, 32nd Pioneers: 28 men.

RHENOCK BAZAR.

Royal Artillery { 1 officer } British.  
34 men  
51 Natives.

Detachment, Derbyshire: 3 officers, 102 men.

13th Bengal Infantry: 3 British officers.  
100 Natives.

Detachment, Pioneers: 1 Native Officer, 50 men.

PAKYONG.

Detachment, 13th Bengal Infantry: 3 British officers.  
200 Natives.

PADONG.

13th Bengal Infantry: 137 Natives.

Pioneers: 3 British officers.  
158 Natives.

RISSUM.

Detachment, 32nd Pioneers: 28 men.

## TEESTA.

Detachment, 32nd Pioneers : 10 men.

## SILIGURI.

Staff Officer, 1.

Detachment, Pioneers, 27.

On the 29th March a scout employed by Mr. Paul came in with the intelligence that 400 Tibetan regulars were just the other side of the Jelep pass and that 1,000 more were at Chumbi, while others were expected to arrive shortly.

In view of this information the following moves were ordered on the 30th :—

- (1) Head-quarters 32nd Pioneers from Garnei, completed by 50 men at Lingtu, to move on the 31st to Shalambi (1 mile on Gnathong road) and entrench themselves there.
- (2) Two hundred men, 32nd Pioneers, from Rongli to move as soon as possible to Jeluk. (On their arrival it was intended to reinforce the Shalambi party by another 100 men and to move the whole on to Gnathong.)
- (3) One hundred and fifty 32nd Pioneers under Colonel Nicholls to move from Padong to Rhenock. Intchi column carriage to be used for these moves, leaving always the 200 men at Padong equipped with carriage for baggage and 10 days' supplies (on mules).


During the first week of April little of importance occurred. Rumours of Tibetan reinforcements, however, continued to be received, and it was deemed advisable to strengthen our more advanced posts. With this object the 200 Pioneers from Rongli were pushed on to Shalambi on the 6th April, and two guns were moved from Sedongchen to Garnei on the same date.

The following day orders were issued directing the relief of the detachments of Pioneers at Teesta Bridge, Dolepchen and Lingtam by parties from the 13th Bengal Infantry. The detachment at Rissum was ordered to be withdrawn. The men who thus became available, 49 in all, were moved up to Jeluk.

On the 9th April Colonel Graham proceeded to Gnathong, selected a site for an entrenched camp, and marked out the lines which the walls were to follow.

On the side next the Tukola pass the hill is so steep that it was considered sufficient to scarp it and build a low wall on the top. On the other three sides a wall of large stones had to be constructed

round the position intended for the permanent garrison of Pioneers. It was proposed to make this wall six feet high with a banquette one and a half feet high. Its shape is roughly shown in the sketch—



The straight side rests on a cliff and is practically unassailable. The only point from which attack can be anticipated is that shown by the arrow, as the ground on this side commands the interior of the work.

This side was, however, to be protected by a ditch and a row of abattis placed in front. It was proposed to encamp the remainder of the force in the space enclosed in the dotted lines, and a low wall, four and a half feet in height, was to be constructed round it as a protection from a sudden rush. There were brushwood and fir trees near the corner of the side marked with an arrow, but these were to be removed to allow of a clear field of fire.

On the 11th the two mountain guns at Garnei moved up to Shalambi, and on the following day accompanied by 75 men of the Derbyshire and 350 Pioneers proceeded on to Gnathong. This move left only 20 Derbyshire and 11 Pioneers at Lingtu, and 50 Pioneers at Shalambi.

From Gnathong the battery and transport mules were ordered back to Shalambi owing to scarcity of fodder at the former place, seven mules per sub-division only remaining with the battery to enable the guns to be moved short distances if required.

On arrival at Gnathong the force was at once set to work on the defences of the camp. This work was completed on the 21st April.

On the 17th, 18th and 19th April, reconnaissances in the direction of the enemy disclosed the fact that no large body of the enemy was on our side of the Jelep pass, although there was a picquet of about ten men near the mouth of the pass. Subsequently these reconnaissances were discontinued by order of the Commander-in-Chief, as it was considered that they were liable to bring about collisions with the enemy—a result not desired by Government. Rumours, more or less reliable, of Tibetan gatherings continued to be received, and, as a precautionary

measure, a company of the Derbyshire was ordered up from Rhenock to Gnathong on the 21st April.

This company arrived on the 26th April. From this date to the 21st May no event of any great importance occurred. The troops were chiefly employed in road-mending, erecting huts, and executing drainage and other works in the vicinity of the several camps. The weather during the greater part of this period appears to have been uniformly bad, but the health of the troops was not injuriously affected—in fact, all things considered, appears to have been remarkably good.

The rain and cold, however, told a good deal on the transport animals. ✓

On the 10th May 50 Pioneers were moved from Lingtu to Jeluk to strengthen the latter party to 100 men. This was deemed necessary owing to the bad state of the road near that place. Twenty men were also moved from Gnathong to replace the above at Lingtu.

On the 21st May the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal arrived at Gnathong, and on the following day a determined attack was made by the Tibetans on the camp. As the fact of his visit was well known all over the country, there can be little doubt but that the Tibetan leaders were influenced by it in fixing on that particular day for their attack.

The following is Colonel Graham's despatch descriptive of the attack :—

From COLONEL T. GRAHAM, Commanding Sikhim Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India,—(No. 66, dated Camp Gnathong, 25th May 1888).

*Attack on Gnathong.*

(1) Return of casualties, Derbyshire Regiment, dated 22nd May 1888.

(2) Ditto ditto 32nd Pioneers.

(3) Sketch of ground round Camp Gnathong.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, an account of the attack on the camp at Gnathong on the 22nd instant, by the Tibetan army under the command of Dnabu Depen.

2. At 5-30 A.M. on the above date large numbers of the enemy were seen coming over the Tukola pass, a point about two miles from camp in the direction of the Jelep pass, and by

*Advance of enemy.*  
6-30 A.M. some 2,000 men must have been in sight. They advanced from the Tukola pass across the valley of the Upper Gnathong stream, and then approached the camp in two main parties, one advancing down the banks of the Upper Gnathong stream, and the other (which was reinforced by a considerable body of men which came over the Pemberingo pass) crossing over the saddle-back to the east of Woodcock Hill, and making their way down the Lower Gnathong valley; a third smaller party also advanced down Picquet Ridge to within some 200 yards of camp (*vide* accompanying rough eye sketch).

3. At about 6 A.M. I moved the two guns to the northern corner of the fort and several shots were fired at the advancing Tibetans at a range of about 1,500 yards. It was difficult to estimate the effect of these shells, but it could be seen that several parties of the enemy were scattered by them.

*Artillery fire.*

4. About the same hour the day picquet (No. 1) of the 32nd Pioneers on Pioneer Picquet Hill withdrew to its night position on the east of camp, owing to the advance of a large body of the enemy into the Lower Gnathong valley. *Retirement of picquet (distant).* Being increased to a strength of twenty men, this picquet maintained its position in a most admirable manner until 9 A.M., when it accompanied the advance of the Derbyshire Regiment.

5. At about 6-30 A.M. No. 3 picquet was increased to a strength of 25 men under the command of Jemadar Ram Singh, Native Adjutant, 32nd Pioneers, and half an hour later a further reinforcement of 25 men was sent down. On this party fell the brunt of the attack, and I consider that the manner in which it not only maintained its position, but also advanced across the stream, reflects the greatest credit both on the commander and on his men, as there could not have been less than at least 500 to 600 men opposed to them. *No. 3 Picquet strengthened.*

6. At about 7 o'clock the enemy commenced to fire from the edges of the woods nearest camp. Their fire was ill-sustained and very irregular, being chiefly from smoothbore muskets, though occasionally the sound of a rifle bullet was heard overhead. A good many bullets fell inside the fort, but did little damage. *Commencement of attack.*

7. In reply, small groups of selected marksmen of the Derbyshire Regiment fired volleys against the enemy who had occupied the slopes of Woodcock Hill and Picquet Ridge, whilst the Pioneers fired similarly against the body of Tibetans who had advanced down the valley of the Upper Gnathong stream, and were visible through the trees as they came down past the "Chuton" (sacred pillar). The two guns, which about 7 A.M. had been moved—one to the centre of the north-eastern face of the fort, and the other to the gate on the eastern face—fired shrapnel whenever they saw any body of the enemy collected together, and, as was afterwards ascertained, with considerable effect. *Description of fire from fort.*

8. About 8-30 A.M. it became evident that the enemy could not advance further, and I directed a party of forty men of the Derbyshire Regiment, under Lieutenant H. A. Iggulden, to advance by No. 1 Picquet (the party at which post he was to take with him), and attack in flank the Tibetans who occupied the slopes of Woodcock Hill. This he satisfactorily accomplished, and the enemy began to retire, though some held their ground, and Lieutenant Iggulden signalled in that he was unable to advance beyond the bottom of the valley owing to a large body of the enemy on his right flank, and that he was getting short of ammunition. I therefore, about 9-30 A.M., sent out another party of twenty-five of the Derbyshire Regiment, under Captain E. A. G. Gosset, with orders to join Lieutenant Iggulden's party and clear the whole of the Lower Gnathong valley as far as the saddle-back. On joining Lieutenant Iggulden, Captain Gosset found that the enemy on his right (*i.e.*, on Pioneer Picquet Hill) had retired, and he therefore directed his advance against the men on the slopes of Woodcock Hill, whom he drove steadily before him until he reached the saddle-back at the head of the valley, inflicting severe loss on them as they retired. *Derbyshire counter-attack and pursuit.*

The enemy displayed considerable bravery, maintaining their position, on several occasions, until the Derbyshire men were within a few yards of them. On reaching the saddle-back, the mist had become so dense that it was impossible to see more than a few yards, but, after waiting a short time, it suddenly lifted, disclosing a large body of the enemy on a hill some 800 yards off. Several volleys were fired at this party, and two ponies and several men were seen to fall; but the

mist again coming on, their friends succeeded in carrying away the bodies, and only that of one pony could be found the next day. Captain Gosset, having been directed not to pursue beyond the saddle-back, returned to camp about 3 o'clock. Sergeant Seckington was killed during the attack on Woodcock Hill.

9. About 9 A.M. I moved the gun from the north-east face up to the northern angle of the fort, and fired two shrapnel at a large body of the enemy, including apparently several of high rank, who were watching the fight from the Tukola pass. The first shell fell short, but the second was most successful, bursting right in the middle of the enemy, who disappeared at once over the hill, and their flight had evidently a most dispiriting effect on their advanced parties. Two dead bodies were subsequently found on the pass, and doubtless others also were killed or wounded. The range was 2,500 yards.

10. Meanwhile, simultaneously with Lieutenant Iggulden's advance, I despatched twenty Pioneers under Lieutenant J.J. Digan straight up Picquet Ridge, which they cleared of the enemy, and being then reinforced by another party of similar strength, they turned to their left through the thick woods on the left bank of the Upper Gnathong stream, and joined another party under Lieutenant H. C. Tytler, which had by that time reached the "Chuton."

11. About 9-30 I completed the party of Pioneers near No. 3 Picquet, which had meanwhile advanced across the stream, to a strength of 75 men, and sent down Lieutenant Tytler to command it. This party being most pluckily led by that young officer, forced their way up as far as the "Chuton" in the face of large numbers of the enemy, who at one time charged down on the Pioneers, but were compelled to fall back before their fire. During this advance the Pioneers lost two men killed and eight wounded. By 10 A.M. the enemy were in full retreat from the "Chuton," and Lieutenant Digan's party having reinforced Lieutenant Tytler, Colonel Sir B. P. Bromhead, *Bart.*, joined them and assumed command; and under his guidance the party cleared the whole of the Upper Gnathong valley and pursued the enemy as far as the Tukola pass. The mist unfortunately interfered a good deal with their movements, but they succeeded in coming across numerous bodies of the enemy, and inflicting severe loss on them. This party returned to camp about 4 P.M.

12. The enemy fled precipitately across the Tukola pass and the pass leading from Mount Paul to Pemberingo. The ground between the Tukola and Nimla passes was strewn with blankets, hats, bags of food, and other evidences of the rapidity with which they had retreated.

13. Our loss consisted of one sergeant of the Derbyshire Regiment and two sepoy, 32nd Pioneers, killed, and one havildar and seven sepoy of the 32nd Pioneers wounded (*vide annexed returns*).

14. The enemy's loss cannot have been less than 100 killed, and probably as many more wounded. Up to the present more than 60 dead bodies have been found, and there is little

doubt that small parties of the enemy came over into the Upper Gnathong valley during the night succeeding the attack and carried off their dead, as the bodies of several who were known to have been killed could not be found the next day. Fourteen prisoners were taken, twelve of them being wounded; and of these latter two have since died.

15. The prisoners state that their force consisted of fully 3,000 men, and I am of opinion that this number is approximately correct.

*Numbers of Tibetans.*

DETACHMENT, 2ND BATTALION, DERBYSHIRE REGIMENT.

*Return of casualties in action at Gnathong on 22nd May 1888.*

SUMMARY.

*Officers—Missing, nil ; killed, nil ; wounded, nil.*

*Non-Commissioned Officers and men—Killed, 1 ; wounded, nil ; missing, nil.*

*Nominal return of Officers killed.*

Nil.

*Wounded.*

Nil.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
2659	Sergeant	Luke Seckington	Gun-shot wound of skull.

GNATHONG,  
*The 22nd May 1888.*

}

(Sd.) H. C. WYLLY, *Captain,*  
*Commanding Detachment, 2nd Battalion,*  
*Derbyshire Regiment.*

32ND REGIMENT OF PIONEERS.

*Return of casualties in action at Camp Gnathong (Sikhim Expeditionary Force) on 22nd May 1888.*

SUMMARY.

*Officers—Missing, nil ; killed, nil ; wounded, nil.*

*Non-Commissioned Officers and men 411—Killed 2 ; wounded, 8 ; missing, nil.*

*Nominal return of Officers killed.*

Nil.

*Wounded.*

Nil.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
1686	Sepoy	Kharak Singh	Gun-shot, head.
1811	Sepoy	Hukam Singh	„ right thigh.

## Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
961	Havildar .	Budha Singh .	Severe . .	Gun-shot, right knee.
1275	Lance Naik .	Assa Singh .	„ . .	„ right thigh.
1947	„ .	Phagga Singh .	Dangerous . .	„ in abdomen.
1667	„ .	Hardit Singh .	Severe . .	„ right arm.
1824	Sepoy .	Kalla Singh .	„ . .	„ right thigh and fracture.
2159	„ .	Atar Singh .	„ . .	„ left hand.
2328	„ .	Narain Singh .	Slight . .	„ lower jaw.
2461	„ .	Lachman Singh .	Severe . .	„ right shoulder.

CAMP GNATHONG, } (Sd.) B. P. BROMHEAD, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*The 24th May 1888.* } *Commanding 32nd Pioneers.*

Having thus completely defeated the enemy's attack, it appeared to Colonel Graham that as the Tibetans had assumed the offensive, it was necessary to inflict further punishment on them, and with this view to advance across the Jelep pass. He therefore ordered up 250 Pioneers from Rongli, Jeluk and Lingtu. When they arrived he proposed to advance with a force of two companies Derbyshire, two guns and 450 Pioneers across the Jelep on Chumbi. This proposal was submitted by wire for approval of Government. In reply, the Viceroy directed that the movement should be delayed pending a decision by Government as to whether Tibet should be invaded.

On the 23rd May the Lieutenant-Governor with an escort of 30 men started on his return-journey.

At 6 A.M. the same day, a company of the Derbyshire under Captain Wyll proceeded to the Tukola pass and Mount Paul. They found two dead bodies in the pass, and the road from it to Nimla strewn with blankets, hats, food, and every trace of a hurried flight. Some 50 to 100 Tibetans were seen making their way over the Jelep carrying burdens, apparently their wounded comrades.

Another party of 20 men was sent to Boorj, but returned without having seen any trace of the enemy.

The remainder of the Gnathong garrison was employed in burying the dead bodies found in the vicinity of the camp, the Derbyshire taking one side and the Pioneers the other. Altogether 62 bodies were found, but judging from tracks in the wood there is little doubt that others were removed during the night by their friends.

During the morning two other parties, one of Pioneers and one of the Derbyshire, were sent to sweep the Upper Gnathong valley and search for wounded men. One wounded Tibetan was brought in, making a total of twelve captured to date. From this man's account it



appears that at about 5 P.M. on the 21st, a sudden order was issued at Rinchingong to number the army, and about 8 o'clock the same evening it got under weigh, intending to reach Gnathong at about 3 A.M. The difficulty, however, of moving a large force along a narrow track by night caused them to be much longer on the road than they anticipated: they did not reach the Tukola pass until about 5 A.M. Here their leaders breakfasted just prior to attacking behind the ridge. Captain Wylly's party found much corroborative evidence of the truth of these statements in the shape of cooking pots, a small European tent, the remains of fires, &c. It was also stated that the Narchung oracle had declared that the Tibetans ought to attack before the 25th.

On the 24th, a company of the Derbyshire under Captain Gosset proceeded to Nimla and to the point on the ridge which commands the Jelep pass. The smoke of various fires was seen, leading to the supposition that the Tibetans were burning their dead.

Another detachment of 100 Pioneers under Lieutenant Tytler scoured the Upper Guathong valley, bringing in two wounded prisoners.

On the 25th May, 70 Pioneers arrived at head-quarters from Jeluk. They reported the road to be in very bad order, and so severe was the strain on the transport animals at this time that it was found necessary to apply for 500 fresh mules. It was also requested that an European Engineer with gangs of coolies should be employed in repairing the road. Otherwise it was feared that the forwarding of supplies to the front might be altogether stopped. Incessant rain (the monsoon having now set in) added greatly to the difficulties of transport, but the health of the troops does not appear to have been injuriously affected, the percentages of sick at the time being—

<i>Health of troops.</i>	British troops	.	.	.	.	2'79 per cent.
	Native	.	.	.	.	5'68 "
	Followers	.	.	.	.	2'31 "
	Mules	.	.	.	.	7'79 "

Many mules, however, although not shown as sick, were in reality hardly able to carry their loads. The prevailing complaint among them was sore-feet, due to the hoofs getting worn away from working on the stony portion of the road after having been employed on the muddy ones.

It was impossible to avoid changing them, as after mules had been at work for a few days on the heavy portion, they became worn out, and it was absolutely necessary to rest them by transferring them to where they would have an easier time. The work of hutting the men was now progressing fairly well.

At 2 P.M. on the 28th May the Pioneer picquet reported that the Tibetans were advancing in force. It turned out, however, to be a

false alarm caused by some of our own men who were escorting Mr. Paul's Assistant, Tendook Pulger, from an expedition round by Mount Paul and the Tukola to choose positions for night picquets for his men. On the way back one of the men had tied his *pagri* to a pole to dry, and it was mistaken by the picquet for a Tibetan standard.

\* Tel. No. 3255A., Simla, 8th June '88, Confidential. From Q.M.G. to O. C., Sikhim. Arrangements had now to be made for the withdrawal of the European part of the force. As we have already seen,\* Government had sanctioned this withdrawal on the commencement of the rains; accordingly on the 17th May the following telegram was despatched by the Adjutant-General in India to Colonel Graham:—

Tel. dated 17th May '88. from A. G. to O. C., Sikhim. "Having regard to probable force which the Tibetans can command, probable force which they could advance into Sikhim, the nature of the country and our positions for defence, do you consider the Pioneers will be sufficient force to leave during rains, or are Native troops required, or are Europeans necessary?"

In reply to the above Colonel Graham wired:—

Tel. dated 19th May '88. From O. C., Sikhim, to A. G. "I consider that the Pioneers are perfectly safe against any force which the Tibetans have at present. I do not consider the presence of Europeans necessary during the rains. Mr. Paul informs me that he has recommended to Government that the wing, 13th Bengal Infantry, should remain during rains at Darjeeling, and this suggestion might with advantage be adopted. In the event of the Tibetans moving large reinforcements from Lhasa, of which it is presumed early intimation would be received from the political authorities, the Pioneers, who would then number nearly 200 rifles more than the present garrison, would be quite able to hold out until reinforced. In fact, quite as well as the force at present here, and in either case reinforcements would be required to enable the garrison to assume the offensive."

This telegram was followed by one to the Quartermaster-General in India, dated 27th May, to the following effect:—

*Copy of a telegram No. 172, dated 27th May 1888, from the Officer Commanding Sikhim, to the Quartermaster-General in India.*

"Confidential. 172, Gnathong, 27th May.

"In continuation my telegram No. 163 of 22nd instant, would submit, on reconsideration, that it is not desirable at present to cross the Jelep pass. I would recommend that the Derbyshire and two guns be withdrawn to India at once, leaving two guns here in addition to the Pioneers. My reasons for this are that the rains having now begun, any forward movement has become most difficult. It would be impossible, even with the 500 extra mules which I have asked for

from the Commissary General, to advance beyond Rinchiong, and having arrived there we should be obliged to wait, as we are doing here, without being more advantageously situated, and with the difficulties of supply enormously increased. Moreover, the state of the roads in our rear, which may become practically impassable, is a serious consideration. By remaining here we compel the Tibetans to keep an army in the field quite as effectually and with far less trouble to ourselves than would be the case were we at Rinchiong. Against Gnathong it is practically impossible for the Tibetans to bring a larger force than they did on the 22nd instant; whereas at Rinchiong it would be a much easier matter for them, and the fact of our being in Tibet would induce them to strain every nerve to turn us out.

"I would further recommend that the wing, 13th Bengal Infantry, should remain at Padong. They would thus be able to protect Sikkim, if necessary, and also to furnish a guard for the Rongli bridge. I consider myself that the Pioneers alone would be perfectly safe at Gnathong, but the Political Officer considers the moral effect of the presence of guns desirable, and I have therefore recommended it. By remaining in the position I propose during the rains, we should be ready in the autumn to make forward movement with three fine-weather months before us, in the event of the Tibetans not having meanwhile decided on a peaceful policy. The Political Officer has suggested a display of force on the Jelep, but I do not consider this desirable unless Government wishes me, under the conditions above detailed, to maintain my position across the frontier, as I consider any retrograde movement undesirable."

On the 30th May the Adjutant-General in India again telegraphed to Colonel Graham relative to the withdrawal as follows:—

"Does your recent experience of the Tibetans modify in any way the opinion expressed in your telegram of 19th May last as to force necessary to keep enemy in check?"

A. G.'s Tel.  
No. 2531A.,  
dd. 30th  
May '88.

"Is artillery required? Are Europeans required? If Natives only, will Pioneers suffice? Are 13th Bengal Infantry required in reserve?"

In reply, Colonel Graham referred Adjutant-General to his telegram No. 172, dated 17th May, to Quartermaster-General, and continued:—

"I have since consulted Colonel Bromhead, who concurs in my opinion that artillery are not required to remain at Gnathong. For military reasons, he would, however, request to be supplied with two old pattern mountain guns similar to those supplied to Assam regiments. These could be worked by the Pioneers and would, he considered, have a good moral effect.

Colonel  
Graham's  
tel. No. 190,  
dd. 1st June.

The application for the supply of these guns was forwarded and recommended to Government by the Commander-in-Chief, and was sanctioned by Government in its letter, Military Department, No. 209S., dated 7th June. The same letter also conveyed sanction for the

*Withdrawal of British Troops sanctioned.* immediate withdrawal of the British portion of the force, leaving a wing, 13th Bengal Infantry, at Padong in support of the 32nd Pioneers at Gnathong.

The Government of Bengal was at the same time requested to issue instructions to Mr. Paul to let the fact of the retention of the garrison at Darjeeling and of the despatch of the guns to Gnathong be known to the Tibetans.

It was further suggested to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be well for Colonel Graham to send back the detachment of the Derbyshire and the guns of the mountain battery quietly and without display, and to arrange for the guns now being sent up to arrive in time to replace the British guns being sent back. Colonel Graham and his staff were to be retained in Sikhim for the present.

Instructions in the above sense were wired to Colonel Graham on the 8th June, and he was directed to initiate *Arrangements for withdrawal of British Troops.* arrangements for the withdrawal. It was accordingly arranged that the Derbyshire should be despatched in parties of 50 men beginning on the 12th June, and the 2 guns, 9-1st Royal Artillery, on the 18th.

Meanwhile after the fight of the 22nd May, daily reconnaissances in the direction of the enemy were carried out, *Reconnaissances.* and the troops were kept fully employed improving the defences, mending the roads, and constructing huts.

Information relative to Tibetan reinforcements, intentions, and movements, was constantly being received. It may be interesting to note that this information was not only obtained through Mr. Paul's men, but also on more than one occasion through the Nepal Durbar, who communicated such intelligence as they received to our Resident at Khatmandu.

On the 9th June two men in the service of the Phodong Lama reported the Tibetan army much discouraged, and that they expressed their inability to attack again without assistance from the Lama army.

The health of the troops still continued good, but the hard work and bad weather had told severely on the transport animals, the Chief Commissariat Officer reporting on 10th June that only about 450 mules out of 1,400 were fit for work.

The state of the road still continued bad, and the progress made in repairing it was far from satisfactory. The principal cause appears to have been the difficulty in obtaining coolies.

On the 12th June, as previously arranged, the first party of 50 men, Derbyshire, left Gnathong *en route* to Jalapahar. This party was followed on the 14th and 16th by detachments of similar strength. It had originally been intended that these men should be quartered at Ghoom, the base depôt, but on the representation of the medical

*Derbyshire located at Jalapahar.*

authorities it was subsequently settled to locate them at the Jalapahar depôt. As these parties moved down, their place at Gnathong was taken by Pioneers moved up from the line of communication, the latter being relieved by men of the 13th Bengal Infantry.

On the 14th June, in view of a possible attack by the Bhutanese, who, it was rumoured, meditated hostile action, fifty men of the 13th Bengal Infantry were ordered up to Lingtu. On the same day the two guns for Gnathong passed through Padong, arriving at the former place on the 16th.

On the 17th June Colonel Graham left Gnathong to inspect the various posts on the line of communications. *Colonel Graham goes on tour of inspection.* As far as Lingtu the road was found to be in good order, requiring hardly any repair. From Lingtu to Jeluk the removal of loose stones and drainage was all that appeared necessary. For the first half mile below Jeluk the road again became good, but below that in parts it was very bad, the soil being clay which had been churned up to a depth of a foot or more by the mules' feet. About a mile above Sedonchen the worst part began. There it was totally impassable by mules, and very nearly so by men on foot.

Mr. White, Assistant Commissioner, had 450 coolies at work on this portion and hoped to get it into working order in about a fortnight. From Kenlaka to Lingtam the road, although passable by mules, still required considerable repair.

On the 18th Colonel Graham's party reached Rongli, where they found the new bridge practically finished, and on the following morning proceeded on to Rhenock Bazar, the road being in good order.

At Pakyong, where the party arrived on the 20th, everything was found to be in a most satisfactory state. Whilst halted here a telegram

*News of enemy.*

was received from Gnathong, stating that the enemy were collecting in the valley and were now striking their tents. In reply, Colonel Bromhead was informed that if he wished he might detain the last party of the Derbyshire who were to leave that day. On arriving at Padong at 7-30 P.M. that evening, however, a wire was received, stating that the Tibetans were building a wall on the pass, but had made no forward movement, and the next morning another telegram from Colonel Bromhead stated that he had not thought it necessary to detain the detachment of the Derbyshire. However, on the 22nd, hearing that 1,000 Tibetan

were building a wall low down in the pass, and that 1,000 more were near the old Sangar higher up the pass, he considered it advisable to recall this party which had then reached Jeluk, and also to bring in the detachment of his regiment at Shalambi, relieving it by men from Lingtu. We shall see that the subsequent course of events neces-

*Rumoured reinforcements.* sitated the permanent retention of these parties at Gnathong. Rumours of the arrival of large Tibetan reinforcements, variously estimated at from 1,500 to 4,500, reached Colonel Graham on the 22nd June. If the latter was the correct number, the force at the disposal of the Tibetan leader would now be about 10,000, but it was very doubtful if more than half that number were really collected.

On the 24th June Colonel Graham marched to Rongli *en route* to Gnathong, arriving at the latter place on the 27th.

During his absence the fort had still further been strengthened, a double line of abattis having been laid down in many places, and, in addition, along the north face a wire entanglement. An inundation had also been made on the east face. On the 29th June the remaining two guns, 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, left Gnathong for Jalapahar, their place being filled by the two post guns manned by Pioneers. The latter had for some time been under instruction in gunnery—a work for which they showed considerable aptitude.

A period of comparative inactivity now supervened, the opposing forces merely watching each other. On our side reconnoitring parties went out morning and evening, occasionally seeing a few of the enemy, and Mr. Paul's spies continued to bring in intelligence, more or less trustworthy, of Tibetan movements and intentions. It must not be supposed, however, that our men remained altogether idle, for ample work was found for them on the fortifications, which were strengthened, where necessary, by block-houses, &c., and in repairing roads.

The health of the men continued excellent in spite of the constant rain.

On the 11th July the telegraph line reached Pakyong, and on the 14th the new road from Rongli to Lingtam was opened for traffic.

On the 15th July, owing to rumours of a collection of arms, &c., near Gantok, Mr. Paul wired to the Bengal Government for permission to commence a road from Pakyong to Gantok, to be used if an advance in that direction should become necessary. This work was commenced on the 19th July.

On the 21st July a party of about 25 Tibetans entered the Kupup valley and were fired on by a few of the Derbyshire at a range of 800 yards. Three men were seen to fall, the remainder rapidly retreating.

The following day Mr. Paul's men reported having seen a continuous stream of men coming over the Pumberingo pass. They had watched them for nearly two hours. They had also seen many mules, and, from the care taken of them, presumed that they carried guns. These were still coming down the hill when the mist interrupted the view. As this news seemed to foreshadow an attack, every one was warned to be on the alert. The next day a reconnoitring party of 40 Derbyshire and 100 Pioneers under Captain Wyll proceeded to reconnoitre.

In the Pumberingo pass about 130 tents were visible, but no signs of any intended movement.

From the Nimla ridge four large tents were seen in the Kupup valley, and about 60 men building a circular wall just below the tents. Several volleys were fired at these, but the effects of our fire could not be distinctly seen, as the Tibetans immediately crowded into their tents.

The continued arrival of reinforcements in the Tibetan camp, however, compelled Colonel Graham to carefully reconsider his position, and on the 23rd July he determined on asking for reinforcements. The following is a copy of his telegram to the Adjutant-General in India:—

*Telegram from Officer Commanding Sikhim Field Force, to Adjutant-General in India,—(No. 533, "Confidential," dated Gnathong, 23rd July 1888).'*

I think it right to bring to His Excellency's notice that, while, as I have already reported, I am perfectly confident of my ability to maintain my position at Gnathong, I do not consider the present position of this force satisfactory, as even if reinforced by the troops held in readiness at Darjeeling, I do not think my present force is sufficient to warrant me in assuming the offensive in the event of the enemy taking up a position in the Kupup valley. Their numbers, according to the reports received by the Political Officer, cannot be less than 8,000, and may be more; and although they are poorly armed and badly disciplined, I consider that, in the event of their endeavouring to establish themselves in Sikhim territory, I should have at my disposal a force of at least fifteen hundred infantry and six guns, in addition to the garrisons on the line, to enable me to assume offensive with effect. At present I have only 500 men available, if I leave a garrison at Gnathong. If Tibetans attack Gnathong, I may be able to inflict such punishment as will ensure Sikhim from molestation in future; but unless they do so, I am not strong enough to prevent their crossing the passes. I trust His Excellency will understand that, in these recommendations, I have no eye to any offensive movement across the passes: I merely wish to guarantee Sikhim from invasion. The troops in readiness at Darjeeling, with the addition of the two remaining guns of the battery and an additional battalion, would suffice; and I would here strongly recommend the advisability, in the event of my suggestions being approved, of detaching a battalion of Gurkhas or other hillmen, and not a plains regiment, as amongst these mountains and at these altitudes the latter is placed at great disadvantage. Meanwhile I request permission to move the company and half of Derbyshire from Darjeeling to Padong, as not only would they be there more



accessible, if required, but the Political Officer considers that this move would probably have a good effect.

The foregoing telegram was forwarded to Government under cover of Adjutant-General's No. 3617 A., dated Simla, 24th July 1888, of which the following is a copy:—

In forwarding the enclosed copy of a telegram from the Officer Commanding Sikhim Expeditionary Force, I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to state that the question of compliance with Colonel Graham's request for additional troops depends, in His Excellency's opinion, on the political information in possession of Government.

2. If the surmise that the Tibetans are collecting in large numbers with the intention of effecting a lodgment within Sikhim territory is well founded, and Government decide that it is undesirable that they should be permitted to establish themselves within the border, then His Excellency agrees with Colonel Graham, that the force at his disposal is insufficient, and that the reinforcement asked for is required.

3. If it is decided to send up reinforcements, the Commander-in-Chief would propose to give Colonel Graham a battalion of Gurkhas. Pending a decision on this point, His Excellency proposes to accord permission for the immediate move of the  $1\frac{1}{2}$  companies of the Derbyshire Regiment now at Darjeeling to Padong, and to place at Colonel Graham's disposal the whole of 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery.

On the 26th July the Quartermaster-General telegraphed to General Officer Commanding Presidency District and also to Colonel Graham, informing them that the movement of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  companies Derbyshire from Darjeeling to Padong was sanctioned. Also the whole of the mountain battery at the former station was placed at Colonel Graham's disposal to reinforce the troops at Gnathong if necessary.

On this date the latest news at the disposal of the Government of Bengal shows that the number of Tibetans between Rinchingong and Kophu was 7,000, in reserve at Linginathong 1,000, with Shafi at Phari 500. Besides these 1,500 were said to have gone to Nathula and many more said to be coming.

On the 27th July Colonel Graham determined on the following moves:— $\frac{1}{2}$  company Derbyshire to Gnathong at once to be located in huts then under construction; the remainder of the Derbyshire to Padong; the mountain battery he determined to retain at Darjeeling, pending receipt of the reply from Government to his request for another battalion of infantry. This reply was given by Government in its letter, Military Department, No. 264 S., dated the 30th July, in which the despatch

*2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas ordered to Sikhim.* of a battalion of Gurkhas, 500 strong, was sanctioned. The battalion detailed for this duty, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, at Dharmsala, was ordered to be immediately prepared for service and equipped in a manner similar to the force already in Sikhim.



On the 29th July 1½ companies of the Derbyshire, strength 3 officers, 127 rank and file, left Jalapahar for the front. The party arrived at Padong on the 31st, at which place one company was halted, the other ½ company continuing its march to Gnathong. On this date orders were issued for the construction of a defensible post close to the bridge at Rongli, and Lieutenant Justice was directed to proceed there from Padong with 25 men to assist. This post or block-house was completed by the 12th August, and the telegraph office was moved to a spot close by it. Another block-house was commenced on the 7th to the west of the Gnathong camp to protect the future Gurkha camp. The ½ company Derbyshire reached Gnathong on the 5th August, 39 strong, leaving the other company and six sick at Padong, where arrangements were made for hutting them. *Arrival of ½ Company Derbyshire at Gnathong.* Huts also were being rapidly constructed for the Pioneers at Gnathong, who were all under cover by the end of the week.

In addition to the 1½ companies Derbyshire, Colonel Graham was informed on the 10th that he was to receive a further reinforcement of 200 Derbyshires, who were to start from Dum-Dum as soon as they were equipped with warm clothing and waterproof sheets.

To turn for a moment to the operations of the Intchí column. Five miles of the road from Pakyong to Gantok were completed by the 5th August, and the work connected with the bridge over the Rári Chu was being pushed on with all possible haste, and was expected to be complete by the 14th of the month. Orders were sent to the Officer Commanding Pakyong not to continue the Gantok road beyond the Taksom Chu river, as he could not do so without advancing his detachment, which would amount to an advance on Gantok—a movement not at that period desired by the Government of India. At the same time he was, for political reasons, urged by Mr. Paul not to discontinue work on the road when once it had reached the Taksom Chu, but to go on improving the gradients.

All kinds of reports continued to come in from Mr. Paul and his agents about the Tibetan forces. On the 6th *Rumours about Tibetan forces.* Colonel Graham heard from the Gantok agent that only a portion of the Shutu Losum troops had arrived, but that they were coming to Phari in driblets. The Lama army were said not to be coming. A subsequent report on the same day said that 2,000 Khambtaya troops had reached Lhasa *en route* to Phari, and that the Nyaram troops would reach Jelep in 18 days' time. Later still on the same day news came from the same source that 11,000 men were between Kupup and Phari, 2,000 more between Gyantzi and Phari, and 500 between Gyantzi and Lhasa. Parties of our men went out morning and evening to watch the enemy's position in the

passes, but little, if any, change was observed. On the 9th Colonel Graham himself went with an escort to the ridge east of Mount Paul, whence he obtained views of the Pemberingo, Nimla, and Shaly passes. At the first he observed that all the walls could easily be enfiladed, and that the situation in the passes generally had undergone little alteration.

Further news of the enemy was brought in on the 10th by two Bhutanese spies who had returned from the Chumbi valley, which they had left on the 21st ultimo. They were told that there were 17,000

*News of enemy.* Tibetans between Kupup and Phari, and that 3,500 Bhutanese were coming to their assist-

ance; they said that they themselves saw 2,000 tents, and that they estimated the numbers at 14,000. Upon the receipt of this intelligence Colonel Graham decided to concentrate as many men as possible at Gnathong. Orders were therefore issued to the company Derbyshire at Padong to move up to Gnathong, where they arrived on the 17th August. Colonel Graham determined also to move up the two companies from Dum-Dum to Gnathong as soon as possible. He had previously expressed a wish that they should not be despatched without their waterproof sheets; but on hearing from the Quartermaster-General that the sheets had been ordered from the Western Circle, he wired directions for their despatch without waiting for the waterproof sheets, which would have caused too much delay. Four guns of 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, arrived in Gnathong on the morning of the 13th; they were short of 17 ordnance mules and 19 transport mules. During the same week the posts of Jeluk, Sedonchen, Lingtam, and Rongli were reduced to 15 men each, the remainder being withdrawn to Padong.

Head-quarters and two companies of the Derbyshire started from Dum-Dum on the 15th, equipped with waterproof sheets. They reached Ghoom on the 16th, and started to march to Gnathong the following day, arriving on the 23rd; they had not got their warm clothing with them, but it reached Gnathong a week later.

Five officers and 276 more men of the Derbyshire reached Jalapahar on the 19th, where they were to be kept in reserve in the Royal Artillery barracks. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, marched up to Gnathong by wings. The head-quarters and 254 men left Ghoom on the 18th and the remainder on the following day, reaching Gnathong on the 24th and 25th respectively. The Derbyshire on arrival were quartered in some double-fly tents, which had recently been sent up from Fort William arsenal.

The Gurkhas had to use their own single-fly tents, which were of themselves almost useless in the heavy rain of Sikkim; but with plank floors and coverings were soon rendered fairly comfortable.

Thus reinforced, Colonel Graham had at Gnathong a total force of 1,691 men and 4 guns made up as follows:—

Derbyshire . . . . .	386	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.
32nd Pioneers . . . . .	791	"
2nd, 1st Gurkhas . . . . .	514	"
9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery	4	guns.

The health of the troops in spite of the wet weather continued excellent, the percentages of sick for the week ending August 26th being as follows:—

<i>Health of</i>	British Troops . . . . .	6'06	per cent.
<i>troops.</i>	Native „ . . . . .	4'25	"
	Followers . . . . .	3'10	"
	Mules . . . . .	4'23	"

The newly-arrived men of the Derbyshire and Gurkhas were daily exercised in going up hill to accustom them to the effects of the high altitude.

Captain Fairbrother reported from Pakyong on the 14th that 80 men of his detachment were encamped near the Taksom Chu, where they were building a bridge over the river. The Raja, he said, strongly objected to road-making as being likely to bring down the Tibetans. Reports had reached him, he added, that not more than 100 men were in Nathula and had built only three small walls. On the same day a

report from Mr. Paul's Gantok agent stated that the enemy would certainly attack in nine days from the date of his letter, *i.e.*, about the 21st. He said that there were certainly not less than 11,000 men across the pass. The Khambtaya troops had not yet arrived. Notwithstanding all these rumours of the concentration of troops, but little alteration in the position of the enemy was visible by our reconnoitring parties. A few men were seen on picquet on the front ridge between Jelep and Pemberingo on the 16th, the line of picquets apparently almost, if not quite, connecting the two passes. On the following day the Tukola picquet reported 30 Tibetans on the Nimla ridge. A party of Derbyshire were at once sent out, but could find no trace of them. Next morning early a party of Pioneers under Lieutenant Holland started off at 3 A.M., to try and catch any Tibetans who might be about, but they were also unsuccessful. On the afternoon of the same day messengers arrived from the Deb Raja of Bhutan with letters, but they were of too old a date to be of importance. The messengers were not allowed to cross the Jelep, but were sent round by Nathula. They stated the number of Tibetans to be 11,000, including villagers and militia; also that the regular troops were getting tired

of waiting in the passes, as food was scarce. Two thousand more men were expected shortly. Another warning was received on the 20th from the indefatigable Nem Sering at Gantok, to the effect that the enemy would certainly attack "either next day or the day after:" he gave the numbers of the enemy as follows:—

<i>Estimated strength of Tibetans.</i>	Gyantzi and Singatzi men . . . . .	1,400
	Lhasa . . . . .	1,000
	Kumbu . . . . .	1,800
	Chumna Chankar . . . . .	1,500
	Shutu Lusum . . . . .	1,300
	Khambtaya . . . . .	8,000
	Bhutanese, under Tunpu Jangpen . . . . .	300
TOTAL . . . . .		15,300

The above numbers do not include 3,000 coolies who were employed in road-making.

Mr. Paul's scouts noticed 50 additional tents in Pemberingo pass the following day, and two white tents away in the direction of Gipmochi.

Throughout the 23rd the Tibetans were heard discharging a cannon, presumably for practice. As many as 100 shots were counted by the Tukola picquet.

In consequence of Nim Sering's last telegram Colonel Graham told off parties ready to pursue in case of attack and issued full instructions to Commanding Officers for their guidance in conducting the pursuit. His preparations were now complete, and he had a sufficient force at hand wherewith to inflict a sharp lesson on the enemy should they venture to assume the offensive.

On the 27th August the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General went with an escort of Gurkhas to Nimla, whence a very clear view of the Jelep was obtained. He counted as many as 200 tents mostly near the lower wall, and saw 50 or 60 men moving about. The following day he went to Trigonometrical Point and obtained a view of the Pemberingo pass; here there were only 150 tents visible. These Tibetan tents were very small, and were estimated to hold about five men apiece. The road from Nathula was visible from Trigonometrical Point; it had been cut away in one place, and Mr. Paul's men reported the construction of "booby-traps" above it. The Tibetans were also said to have made a good road from Phari to Rinchingong, and Mr. Paul's men stated that a large portion of their force was at the latter place. Grain was said to be stored in considerable quantities at Linginatong, a place two miles across the Jelep, so that the reports about the scarcity of food among the troops were open to doubt.

On the 30th the Gurkhas and the 4 guns, 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, marched out to Nimla for exercise, and the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General proceeded thence to the north end of the Nimla ridge with an escort. The pass which leaves the Kupup valley north of the Jelep, and joins the latter near the summit, was distinctly visible. It appeared passable by infantry and was undefended. The Tibetans had raised the lower wall on the Jelep to a height of 7 feet; they did not appear to anticipate an attack, and took no notice of the British force near the Nimla. Further reports arrived from Nim Sering the next day that 1,000 unarmed troops had reached the Jelep five days previously. The Khambtaya, Shutu Losum, and other warlike tribes had gone to the Pemberingo side, leaving less warlike portions of the force in the Jelep. The next three days passed without any events worthy of note, but on the 5th September Nim Sering reported from Gantok that the Tibetans intended to make a feint attack from Jelep, their real attack being delivered from Pemberingo. He added that the recently-arrived Khambtaya troops were great warriors; they had no firearms, but carried swords only, and generally acted as a reserve.

On the morning of the 9th September, at 3 A.M., Captain Fulton with the Tukola picquet (Gurkhas) started for the Kupup and remained about the valley till 11 A.M. He left two small parties at Mount Paul and Nimla, with orders to fire at any man coming from Pemberingo. One or two small parties did come, but as soon as the Gurkhas advanced to fire, they retreated. General Graham's object—for he had been recently given the temporary rank of Brigadier—in sending a party into the Kupup was threefold:

*Visit to the Kupup Valley.*

- (i) to accustom Tibetans to the presence of British troops there, that in case of an advance they might not at once take the alarm;
- (ii) to show them that they could not enter the valley without risk;
- (iii) General Graham thought that if a report that the Shafi had arrived at the front were true, some demonstration might be made in the passes, and he wished to have an officer there to report any such occurrence.

On the 12th, about 2 P.M., Lieutenant Ryder, also with the Tukola picquet, stole down to the lake below Mount Paul under cover of a thick mist. He rushed the front Tibetan picquet in Pemberingo, killed two men and took one prisoner. The information he (the prisoner) could give was trivial. He said food was not scarce, and that he believed there were from 2,000 to 3,000 men in the Pemberingo pass.

The last news of the enemy was from the Dingpen Kheyan from Gantok, to the effect that 3,000 monks from the large monasteries had arrived in Chumbi, replacing 2,000 villagers who had been sent back as useless. About this period the enemy seemed to consider an attack by us on the passes imminent, for on our reconnoitring parties' advance, the walls were invariably manned. Still their position remained apparently unchanged, and there was no sign of any stir or movement going on.

Our troops during these weeks had not been idle. The Pioneers were making and improving the roads to Mount Paul and Nimla. The Derbyshire and Gurkhas were building huts, and had made walls and abattis to protect their camp. Block-houses had been constructed at every post on the line, the last one at Jeluk being completed on the 9th. The telegraph had been carried on by Mr. Hare to Mount Paul, and posts had been erected in the direction of Nimla, so as to be ready for use in case of an advance. The Tibetans caused much trouble by pulling down the posts during the night, and filling the holes with stones. Accordingly, parties of Gurkhas used to sally forth at night in hopes of catching some of the offenders engaged in their work of destruction. But in this they were never successful.

Finally, on the 18th September, news arrived from the Phodang Lama that the Tibetans would attack the British position on the 20th, and that 6,000 monks were expected at Phari.

Again the day of the threatened attack passed by without any occurrence, and the day after Major Keith with two guns, 100 Derbyshire and the Gurkha picquet, had a slight brush with the enemy. Our party moved round *via* Nimla to the Shaly pass. Seeing this the enemy manned the Jelep walls and opened fire with nine cannon and some small arms. They maintained this fire for an hour, but none of their shots came near our men. The Tibetans evidently thought we were about to attack them, and presumably their whole force in the Jelep was visible,—*viz.*, about 2,000 men. Their cannon were small, but two of them appeared rather larger than the rest.

The following day, when the Gurkha picquet reached Nimla, they were fired on by some 200 Tibetans on the Nimla-Mount Paul ridge and Mount Foulerton. Being reinforced by two companies of Pioneers, who were coming up to mend the road, they drove the enemy back to the mouth of the Jelep pass.

At last, on the morning of the 24th September, it was discovered that the Tibetans during the night had established themselves in the entrenched position, Tukola, Mount Paul, Trigonometrical Point ridge. As soon as it became evident that the enemy did not mean

to advance, General Graham decided to attack. The following is his official report of the capture of the passes leading into Tibet, and the defeat of the Tibetan army :—

FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. GRAHAM, Commanding Sikhim Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India,—(No. 147, dated Camp Gnathong, the 2nd October 1888.)

I have the honor to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in Chief, a report of the operations resulting in the capture of the passes leading into Thibet and the defeat of the Tibetan army commanded by Gnabu Depen.

2. *Tibetan position.*—At daybreak on the morning of the 24th ultimo it could be seen from Fort Gnathong that the Tibetans had occupied in force the whole range of hill from the Tukola peak on the west, past Mount Paul to the Trigonometrical Point on the east (*vide* accompanying sketch by Lieutenant Iggulden, 2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment), and had also placed an advanced post on an isolated hill in the Upper Gnathong valley. The greater part of this position, which is nearly three miles in length, appeared to be strengthened by a stone wall some three or four feet in height. The enemy announced his presence by loud shouts and the frequent discharge of jingals, and also some cannon of a larger size which were placed at intervals. Considering that the position could not have been occupied until some time after dark the previous evening, I estimate that at least 7,000 men must have been at work during the night.

3. *Attack decided on.*—As it soon became evident that the Tibetans did not intend to advance nearer to Gnathong, I decided to assume the offensive.

4. *Preliminary arrangements.*—Before starting the men had their breakfasts, and a day's cooked rations per man was arranged for, to be carried in their haversacks. The mules were also ordered in from Shalambi and the men's kits packed ready to be sent on after the advancing columns, as well as two days' rations which had previously been made over to regiments in view of an advance.

5. *Formation for attack.*—By 8 A.M. all was ready and the force advanced to the attack in three columns as follows :—

*Left column. Order of march.*

- \*1 Company, 2-1st Gurkhas (advance guard).
- 2 Companies, 2-1st Gurkhas.
- 4 guns, 9-1 Northern Division Royal Artillery.
- 3 Companies, 2-1st Gurkhas.
- 3 Companies and head-quarters, 2nd Derbyshire Regiment.

(2) The centre column, as per margin,† under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir B. Bromhead, *Bart.*, 32nd Pioneers, was directed to proceed up the main Tukola road, keeping level with the left column, to

*Centre column—strength.*

† 3 Companies, 32nd Pioneers.

which it was to act as a right flank guard.

(3) The right column as per margin,‡ under command of Major H. Craigie-Halkett, 32nd Pioneers, was directed to proceed to the saddleback north-east of Woodcock Hill, and hold its position there with a view to meeting any forward movement of the enemy's left, and also to deceive him as to our real point of attack.

*Right column—strength.*

- ‡1 Company, 2nd Derbyshire Regiment.
- 2 Companies, 32nd Pioneers.
- 2 Fort guns (worked by Pioneers).



6. *Arrangements for Fort.*—Major T. H. Goldney, 32nd Pioneers, was left in command of the fort with three companies of his regiment and small guards of the 2nd Derbyshire Regiment and 2-1st Gurkhas.

7. *Commencement of action. Right column.*—At about 9-30 A.M. the guns of the right column came into action against the enemy's walls in the centre of the valley and made excellent practice. They were assisted by volleys from a section of the Derbyshire, and about 10 A.M. the occupants of the walls were seen retiring rapidly towards Mount Paul.

8. *The centre column.*—The centre column next became engaged at about 10 A.M., having got somewhat ahead of the left column owing to having an easier road to traverse, and also to the mist which covered the whole valley shortly after the advance began, rendering it almost impossible to maintain communication with the left column. About a quarter of an hour later Colonel Bromhead had made his way without loss to a point on the road some 300 yards from the Tukola pass; and here he halted, sending Lieutenant Holland with a small party to the top of the hill on his immediate left.

9. *The left column.*—At 10 A.M. the left column had reached a peak 800 yards from the Tukola, and the guns fired two or three rounds at the enemy's fortifications on the peak, taking advantage of a transient glimpse of his position obtained through the mist. At 10-30 the Gurkhas of the advance-guard reached the hill occupied by Lieutenant Holland's party, and both they and the Pioneers on the road below opened a hot fire on the enemy, which was replied to vigorously all along their line of walls, but with little effect, as most of their bullets passed harmlessly over our heads, and only two Pioneers were slightly wounded.

10. *Capture of Tukola Peak. Flight of Tibetans.*—Ten minutes later, our men having recovered their breath, I directed Captain Robinson, who was in command of the three leading companies of Gurkhas, to storm the Tukola peak, taking with him Lieutenant Holland's party of Pioneers. This was done in capital style, Colonel Bromhead's party at the same time advancing along the road, straight at the pass itself. The Tibetans waited until our men were within 50 yards of them and then turned and fled, their walls being at once occupied by the Gurkhas and Pioneers, who opened a hot fire on the fugitives. On seeing their right turned, the remainder of the Tibetans apparently considered further resistance hopeless, and the flight became general along their whole line.

11. *Pursuit.*—The guns were at once brought into action on the Tukola peak against the enemy who were retreating over the Nimla pass. Colonel Bromhead with the Pioneers was directed to pursue along the main road, two companies of the Gurkhas being with him and the Derbyshire in close support, whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Rogers, with the remainder of the Gurkhas, took the direct road along the ridge towards Mount Paul, keeping one company in the valley on his left.

The guns advanced as soon as their fire was masked by the advancing infantry, and by noon the whole of the centre and right columns was concentrated at the Nimla pass, with the exception of the Gurkhas under Lieutenant-Colonel Rogers, who had pursued the enemy over Mount Paul to the entrance to the Pemberingo pass, where they had halted.

12. *Halt.*—I now halted and allowed the men to rest, whilst I prepared for the attack on the passes.

13. *Arrangements for attack on passes.*—I despatched the Pioneers of the centre column, who were now commanded by Lieutenant Holland, owing to Colonel Bromhead having been severely wounded shortly after leaving the Tukola pass, to join the right column which had advanced to Mount Paul, and directed Major Craigie-Halkett to send his company of Derbyshire to join me and with the



remainder of his force hold in check the Pemberingo Tibetans, whilst I attacked the Jelep pass. At the same time I signalled to Colonel Rogers to move to the north end of the Bidangcho lake and halt until I joined him. A message was also sent to the detachment, 13th Bengal Infantry, at Shalambi, to join me as soon as possible.

*Order of march against Jelep Pass.*

- \*1 Company, Derbyshire (advance guard).
- 1 Company, Derbyshire.
- 4 Guns, 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery (with escort, 50 Gurkhas).
- 1 Company, Derbyshire.
- 5½ Companies, Gurkhas.

14. *Advance against Jelep Pass.*—By 2 P.M. all necessary movements were completed, and I moved forward against the Jelep pass. The force advanced in the order shown in the margin,\* and as soon as the entrance to the Jelep valley was reached the guns came into action, two on the spur

on the left bank of the stream and two on some high ground immediately below, firing first at the lower and afterwards at the centre Jelep wall. At the same time the infantry formed for attack in the valley itself, the Derbyshire on the left of the road and the Gurkhas parallel to them on the right.

15. *Capture of Jelep Pass.*—The Tibetans replied to the guns but feebly with jingals and matchlocks, and after a few rounds had been fired, I directed the infantry to advance. On their approach the enemy retreated rapidly and the lower and centre walls were occupied successively almost without opposition.

16. *Bivouack.*—The force bivouacked in the pass, and as the baggage did not come up until after midnight and the rain came down heavily, the men passed an uncomfortable night.

17. *Advance across Jelep Pass.*—The next morning the pursuit was continued

*Order of march across Jelep Pass.*

- † 1 Company, Derbyshire (advance guard).
- 3 Companies, Derbyshire.
- 4 Guns, 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery.
- 6 Companies, Gurkhas.
- Detachment, 13th Bengal Infantry (rear guard).

over the pass to Rinchagong, distance about ten miles, the column being formed as shown in the margin.† But little resistance was encountered *en route*, only a few long shots being fired at the advance guard, but our progress was much impeded by the rough and precipitous nature of the road, which was covered with large rocks and boulders. The enemy had, moreover, broken down three out of the seven bridges over which the road passes, thus causing additional delays.

18. *Rinchagong occupied.*—Rinchagong was reached at 4 P.M., and beyond a few shots fired as soon as we came in sight and replied to by the advance guard, it was undefended. The enemy's loss was four or five killed in the village, and several fugitives were also shot. As we entered the village a stream of men flying from the direction of Pemberingo could be seen coming down a ridge to the south; on perceiving us, however, they turned off in the direction of Bhutan.

19. *Night of 25th.*—The night was passed without molestation, though several Tibetans, who endeavoured to pass the Derbyshire picquet, which was on the Pemberingo road, were shot.

20. *Advance to Chumbi.*—The next morning the force proceeded to Chumbi, three miles up the Mochi river, the bivouac for the night being at Myatong, two miles on the Jelep side of Rinchagong.

21. *Enemy completely defeated.*—The enemy appeared to be completely disorganized and thoroughly beaten and dispirited, not a single shot being fired at the force during the march to Chumbi.

22. *Return to Gnathong.*—The day following, the 27th ultimo, the force returned to Gnathong, a long march of fifteen miles, the ascent to the summit of the Jelep pass being particularly trying both for men and animals, and the difficulties of the road being much increased by the pouring rain.

23. *Number and guns of Tibetans.*—The number of the enemy opposed to us on the 24th ultimo, was, so far as can be ascertained, about 11,000, of which some 8,000 advanced to the Tukola ridge. They possessed about twenty jingals and small cannon, but these were withdrawn early in the fight and either hidden or carried away, and frequent search parties, subsequently sent out, have failed to discover them. One 6-pr. brass smooth-bore field gun, complete with carriage, was captured and brought to Gnathong. Large quantities of powder, arrows, and other warlike stores were destroyed at Rinchagong.

24. *Losses of Tibetans.*—The Tibetans' loss may be estimated at 400 killed and at least as many more wounded. About 200 prisoners remained in our hands, but many of those captured across the passes being wounded were released.

25. *British losses.*—Our loss was Lieutenant-Colonel Sir B. Bromhead, *Bart.*, Commanding 32nd Pioneers, severely wounded; 1 sepoy, 2-1st Gurkhas, severely wounded; and 2 sepoys, 32nd Pioneers, slightly wounded. I attach a report of the casualties.

26. *Behaviour of troops.*—I would further wish to record my high opinion of the behaviour of the troops throughout these operations. Not only was the fire well controlled during action, as is evidenced by the fact that some 8 or 9 per cent. of shots fired took effect, but during the subsequent pursuit, which involved much hard work and more than ordinary exposure to wet and cold, the spirit evinced by all ranks could not have been surpassed. Officers and men vied with one another in exhibiting a cheerfulness under difficulties, and a determination to overcome them, which I gladly take this opportunity of bringing to His Excellency's notice.

27. *Officers specially mentioned.*—In conclusion, I beg specially to mention the following officers:

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Benjamin Bromhead, *Bart.*, Commanding the 32nd Pioneers, has, throughout the campaign, been of the greatest assistance to me, and on this occasion especially was conspicuous by the able manner in which he conducted the advance of the centre column. The loss which the force has sustained by his being severely wounded can hardly be over-estimated.

My thanks are also due to Lieutenant-Colonel J. McCleverty, Commanding 2nd Derbyshire Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Rogers, Commanding 2-1st Gurkhas, and Major J. Keith, Commanding Royal Artillery, for the manner in which they assisted me in carrying out my plans, and also to Major H. Craigie-Halkett, 32nd Pioneers, for the admirable way in which the advance of the right column was conducted.

Being obliged to leave some officer upon whom I could rely in command of the fort, I selected Major T. H. Goldney, 32nd Pioneers, for this duty, which he performed in the most satisfactory manner.

I would bring especially to notice the conduct of Captain G. H. Robinson, 1-1st Gurkhas (attached, 2-2nd Gurkhas), and Lieutenant G. L. Holland, 34th Pioneers (Officiating Adjutant, 32nd Pioneers), during the assault on the Tukola, the capture of which decided the fate of the day. On the latter officer devolved the command of that portion of the 32nd Pioneers which formed the centre column after Colonel Bromhead was wounded, and though he has been but a short time with the regiment I was able to see that he had thorough control over his men and kept them well in hand.

To Captain E. A. Travers, 1-2nd Gurkhas, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the Expeditionary Force, I am deeply indebted. His tact and judgment, his careful attention to detail and the very frequent reconnaissances he has made, have been on all occasions of the greatest assistance to me, and I would especially wish to record how much I appreciate his valuable services.

To Captain H. Mansfield, Chief Commissariat Officer, my special thanks are due, not only for the able and untiring manner in which he has throughout supervised Commissariat and Transport matters, but especially for his admirable arrangements on this occasion, owing to which the successful advance of the force to Chumbi was very largely due.

The medical arrangements of the force were carried out satisfactorily by Surgeon-Major R. H. Carew, Medical Staff, Senior Medical Officer with the Force.

**NO. 9 BATTERY (MOUNTAIN), 1ST BRIGADE, NORTHERN DIVISION, R. A.**

*Return of casualties in action on 24th September 1888.*

**SUMMARY.**

*Officers 3—Killed, nil; wounded, nil; missing, nil.*

*Non-Commissioned Officers and men 51—Killed, nil; wounded, nil; missing, nil.*

**NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS.**

*Killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

*Wounded.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>		

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>	

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>		

*Report on the Sikhim Expedition.**Nominal return of Officers and men missing.*

Rank.	Name and Regimental No., if a Soldier.	Explanatory Remarks.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

DATED AT GNATHONG, }  
20th September 1888. }

J. KEITH, Major,  
Commanding 9-1 (M.) Northern Division, R. A.

## 2ND BATTALION, DERBYSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT.

*Return of casualties in action at Tukola, &c., on 24th—27th September 1888.*

## SUMMARY.

*Officers 12—Killed, nil ; wounded, nil ; missing, nil.*

*Non-Commissioned Officers and men 364—Killed, nil ; wounded, nil missing ; nil.*

## NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS.

*Killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

*Wounded.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>		

NOTE.—This return is to be prepared by regiments, corps, and detachments in duplicate, one copy to be sent to the General Officer Commanding the Station, Division, or Brigade, to accompany the despatches, the other copy to be sent to the Director-General of the Army Medical Department.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>	

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>		

*Nominal return of Officers and men missing.*

Rank.	Name and Regimental No., if a Soldier.	Explanatory Remarks.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

DATED AT CAMP GNATHONG, }  
28th September 1888.

J. McCLEVERTY, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Commanding 2nd Derbyshire Regiment.

Army Form B. 103.  
(Late W. O. Form 713.)

2-1ST GURKHA REGIMENT OF LIGHT INFANTRY.

*Return casualties in action at Tukola ridge on 24th September 1888.*

SUMMARY.

*Officers 8—Killed, nil ; wounded, nil ; missing, nil.*

*Non-Commissioned Officers and men 475—Killed, nil ; wounded 1 ; missing, nil.*

NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS.

*Killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

*Report on the Sikhim Expedition.**Wounded.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>		

NOTE.—This return is to be prepared by regiments, corps and detachments, in duplicate, one copy to be sent to the General Officer Commanding the Station, Division, or Brigade, to accompany the despatches, the other copy to be sent to the Director-General of the Army Medical Department.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>	

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
715	Sepoy	Karbir Thapa	Severe	Gunshot wound of left shoulder with compound fracture of left shoulder-blade.

*Nominal return of Officers and men missing.*

Rank.	Name and Regimental No., if a Soldier.	Explanatory Remarks.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

DATED CAMP, GNATHONG, }  
28th September 1888. }

G. W. ROGERS, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Commanding 2-1st Gurkha Light Infantry.*

32ND REGIMENT OF PIONEERS.

*Return of casualties in action at Jelep Pass (Sikhim Field Force)  
on 24th September 1888.*

SUMMARY.

*Officers 18—Killed, nil ; wounded, 1 ; missing, nil.*

*Non-Commissioned Officers and men 548—Killed, nil ; wounded, 2 ; missing, nil.*

NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS.

*Killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
	<i>Nil.</i>	

*Wounded.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
Lieutenant-Colonel	Sir B. P. Bromhead	Severe . . .	1188 A. Wound left extremity, muscular. Incised, sword. 1167 A. Wound elbow-joint, left. Incised, sword. 1166 A. Wound upper extremity, forearm. Incised, sword (one muscular, one superficial). 1173 C. Compound fracture, right forearm, direct, sword.

NOTE.—This return is to be prepared by regiments, corps, and detachments in duplicate, one copy to be sent to the General Officer Commanding the Station, Division, or Brigade, to accompany the despatches, the other copy to be sent to the Director-General of the Army Medical Department.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
		<i>Nil.</i>	

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.*

Regl. No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
1766	Sepoy	Gurdit Singh	Slight	1166 E. Wound upper extremity, left, gunshot.
2124	Sepoy	Jowala Singh	Slight	1166 E. Wound upper extremity, left, gunshot.

} Superficial.

*Nominal return of Officers and men missing.*

Rank.	Name and Regimental No., if a Soldier.	Explanatory Remarks.
	Nil.	

DATED CAMP, GNATHONG, }  
28th September 1888.

T. H. GOLDNEY, Major,  
Commanding 32nd Pioneers.

Army Form B. 106.

## NATIVE TROOPS.

*Return of casualties in action at Tukola, Sikhim, on 24th September 1888.*

## SUMMARY.

*Officers—Killed, nil ; wounded, 1 ; missing, nil.**Non-Commissioned Officers and men—Killed, nil ; wounded, 3 ; missing, nil.*

## NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS.

*Killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
	Nil.	



*Wounded.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
Lieutenant-Colonel	Bromhead, Sir B.	Severe . . .	1173 C. Fracture of both bones of forearm, right, by sword cut. 1167 A. Incised wound of elbow-joint. 1166 A. Incised wound of forearm. 1188 A. Incised wound of thigh.

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed.*

Rank.	Name.	Nature of Wound.
	Nil.	

*Nominal return of Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.*

No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of Wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of Wound.
715	Sepoy	Kurbir Thapa	Severe . . .	1171 E. Compound fracture of scapula.
2124	Sepoy	Jowalla Singh	Slight . . .	1166 E. Wound of hand, superficial.
1766	Sepoy	Gurdit Singh	Slight . . .	1166 E. Wound of arm, superficial.

DATED GNATHONG, }  
29th September 1888. }

G. H. PEEVOR, *Surgeon-Major,*  
*In Charge No. 7 Field Hospital.*

*Advance on Gantok.*

An advance on Gantok had now become desirable owing to the mischievous activity of the Tibetan party in that place, and the collapse of the leading men in our interest.

On the matter being referred to His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, he fully concurred in the course as suggested being carried out, and requested that General Graham might be instructed to communicate on the subject with His Honour the Lieutenant-

*Vide*  
A. G.'s Diary  
No. 175 A.  
Field Op., and  
No. 350S.,  
M. D.

Governor of Bengal, and with His Honour's approval to adopt such measures as might be necessary.

Tel. No. 832,  
dd.  
Gnathong,  
10th

The following is a copy of a telegram from General Graham, to Quartermaster-General, advocating an advance on Gantok :—  
Sept. '88, fm. G. O. C., Sikkim, to Q. M. G.

"Would point out desirability on military grounds of my being allowed to move a force to Gantok for the following reasons: *first*, it would cause Tibetans to believe that we intended an advance *via* the Chola or Nathula passes, and thus induce probably to further separate their forces; *secondly*, it would put end to the constant rumours of hostile movements in the neighbourhood of Gantok and stop any ideas of "Skan" overt hostility on the part of unfriendly Sikkhimese; *thirdly*, it would allay the constant scares which now occur in Darjeeling by interposing a force directly between that place and the Chola and Nathula passes. I consider that two hundred of the 13th Bengal Infantry are sufficient for the purpose, as no resistance is to be anticipated; and the palace at Intchi is, if held by us, a very strong position; if, however, move is sanctioned, I would beg to refer you to my confidential telegram No. 697 of 14th August."

To this the Quartermaster-General replied in his No. 6758, dated Simla, 17th September 1888 :—

"The question referred to in your telegram of 10th instant, under consideration of Government as a political question."

Tel.  
No. 856, dd.  
Gnathong,  
17th  
Sept. '88.

General Graham wired again to the Quartermaster-General on the 17th, stating that he was in communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and requesting, in the event of his plan being approved, to be allowed a reinforcement of 50 or 100 Derbyshire from Darjeeling to remain with the guns at Padong.

No. 6816,  
dd. Simla,  
18th  
Sept. '88.

This request the Quartermaster-General agreed to, and wired instructions to General Officer Commanding Presidency to despatch the men to Padong if General Graham should apply for them.

No. 6817,  
dd. Simla,  
18th  
Sept. '88.

He also informed General Graham of his agreement to the request for reinforcements.

Tel. No. 2043,  
Confdl.,  
fm. G. O. C.  
Presdy. to

The General Officer Commanding Presidency, however, was unwilling to part with more than 50 Derbyshire unless he might replace them with 50 men of the Leinster Regiment at Fort William.

Q. M. G., 19th Sept. '88, Darjeeling.

Tel. No. 8877,  
dd. Simla,  
21st Sept. '88,

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief also thought that 50 men would be enough to secure Padong.

fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C., Sikkim.

No. 877, dd.  
Gnathong,  
22nd Sept.  
'88, fm.  
G. O. C.  
Sikkim, to

But being solicited by General Graham to reconsider his decision, he did so and finally agreed to 100 men being sent to Padong. The Darjeeling garrison being strengthened by 50 men of Leinster Regiment.

Q. M. G. Tel. No. 7077 A., Simla, 23rd Sept. '88, fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C., Sikkim.  
Tel. No. 7076 A., Simla, 23rd Sept. '88, fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C. Presdy.

The 100 men of the Derbyshire arrived at Padong marching by parties of 50 on the 24th and 28th respectively. Colonel Michell with 150 men of the 13th Bengal Infantry occupied Gantok on the 23rd September without any resistance being offered. The Raja, however, escaped prior to their arrival.

Tel. No. 884, dd. Gnathong, 23rd Sept. '88, fm. G. O. C., Sikkim, to Q. M. G.

The troops were quartered in the palace, which provided ample accommodation.

On the 27th rumours of an intended attack by the Tibetans on Pakyong induced Captain Cunningham to advance with 50 men of the Derbyshire and 2 guns as far as Rhenock Bazar. But as no signs of the enemy were seen, he returned the same evening to Padong.

The following day Colonel Michell received telegraphic instructions from General Graham at Gnathong to visit Tumlong, the capital of Sikkim, with a view to reassure the people. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, Colonel Michell left Gantok for Kabbi *en route* for Tumlong with the following party :—

10 Sappers under Lieutenant Sandbach, R.E.  
50 13th Bengal Infantry, under Lieutenant Robin.  
Mr. White, Political Officer.

*Colonel Michell's  
march from Gantok to  
Tumlong.*

Kabbi is 12 miles distant from Gantok, and the road consists of a series of steep ascents and descents.

Two rivers were crossed, the Rahni and the Dik Chu. The first was fordable, but the Dik Chu was not; it was, however, spanned by a good temporary bridge fit for ponies. Deputations of natives met the party at intervals during the march, bearing goats, fowls, eggs, fruit, &c., as tokens of their good-will. The camping ground at Kabbi is situated above the village, on open ground, and has a good spring of water close at hand. Leaving Kabbi next morning the party marched into Tumlong, distance 6 miles. The road on the whole was good, though the gradients were steep in several places. The two rivers, Bokcha Chu and the Rungjung Jora, were both bridged. Deputations bearing gifts met the party, as on the previous day. Both Lamas and people were very friendly and seemed glad to see the troops.

About a mile below Tumlong Colonel Michell's party were received by the Khan's Dewan, the elder brother of the Phodang Lama. They then proceeded to the durbar hall and interviewed the Raja's sister, who permitted the troops to be quartered in the courtyard.

"As a political move," Colonel Michell says, "there is no doubt that this marching of troops to the capital of Sikkim has had a beneficial effect; the cordiality with which we have everywhere been greeted and the hospitality received, show that friendly relations have been established."

Colonel Michell halted two days at Tumlong. The first day he explored the road to Mafila pass, about 8,000 feet, and 4 miles distant. The road he described as very steep and bad, impassable for unladen mules in its then condition. But 100 men, he says, working ten hours a day, could render it passable for laden animals in two days. Mafila commands a fine view of a large portion of Sikkim, including Darjeeling and the Teesta valley. *A point just above it would make a good signalling station* for Gantok, Padong, Pakyong, and Darjeeling. Unfortunately the ridge is waterless, the nearest spring being a mile distant. The

*Road to Teesta Valley.* second day the road leading to the Teesta valley *viâ* the Detong monastery was reconnoitred.

Colonel Michell describes it as fairly level and in good order, requiring very little labour to convert it into a first-class hill road. A darbar was held on the afternoon of the same day in the palace. All the troops were drawn up under arms, and the Political Officer explained to the assembled Lamas and the Raja's sister the reason for the visit of the troops.

On the 3rd October the party started on its return-journey, marching *viâ* Kabbi and Sathala, and halting at the hamlet of Runkpo, on the Fieungong ridge, situated on the road leading to the Chola pass. The elevation of Runkpo is about 5,300 feet; two springs were discovered and roads made to them—the nearer one for the troops, the other some 800 yards down for coolies and mules. The party halted on the 4th at Runkpo and reconnoitred the Chola pass road as far as the summit of Fieungong, 12,130 feet, and 8 miles distant. The path lies on the ridge, and whenever this is steep, the road is bad and slippery, and *vice versâ*. The following day they returned to Gantok, distant 13 miles, and arrived at 2 P.M.

*Return to Gantok.*

#### PHASE IV.

Having thus captured the passes leading into Tibet and inflicted a signally crushing defeat upon the Tibetan army, the British troops under General Graham returned to their quarters at Gnathong. The next few days were employed in sending out parties to destroy the walls in the passes, and to search for wounded men and abandoned arms. They succeeded in finding a number of jazails, but the enemy seem to have carried off all their cannon.

All accounts go to show that the Tibetans were now completely disheartened, and that the Chinese were at last beginning to take more active steps toward bringing about a settlement. The Popen, a Chinese official, reached Rinchagong on the 5th October to announce the arrival of the Ampa.

*Tibetans disheartened.*

On the 7th October General Graham started on a tour of inspection to Gantok, marching *viâ* Tanitso and Lagyap. His escort was formed of a party of 60 Gurkhas, and the baggage was carried by 89 Tibetan prisoners. Starting at 8 A.M., the party followed the Jelep road as far as the bridge over the Jelep river, then turned due north up the Kupup valley, crossed the Nemitso defile, and joined the Nathula road beyond Pheapsu. Thence the ascent of the Sebula pass, 14,000 feet high, was long and steep, and ere the summit was reached the prisoners with the baggage were exhausted. The absence, however, of water and fuel prevented the party halting till a spot beyond Tiphu was reached at 6 P.M. The road was strewn with huge boulders, and, notwithstanding the efforts of the Gurkhas, the prisoners carrying the baggage straggled very much, and seven of them succeeded in escaping altogether.

Next morning starting at the same hour, the party pushed on hoping to reach Gantok that night, but failing to do this they were compelled to halt two miles above the Roro Chu river. Captains Travers and Foulerton, who had gone ahead hoping to reach Gantok and send back coolies, missed their way at the Lagyap, and took the road *viâ* Jongchen and Shintingla to Pakyong. Gantok was reached the following day at noon. The troops, consisting of 150 13th Bengal Infantry and one section of sappers, were quartered in and about the palace.

The palace is a substantial stone building, two stories high, on a hill some 6,100 feet above sea-level, and commands the road leading to Tumlong, Pakyong, and Nathula passes. The position is a very strong one, and may be considered impregnable against troops unprovided with artillery. Water is good and plentiful, and completely under the fire of the defenders of the palace. A breast-work had been constructed on the edge of the platform on which the palace stands, so as to sweep the slopes of the hill with fire.

Captains Travers and Foulerton reached Gantok on the morning of the 10th from Pakyong. They reported the road from Lagyap to Pakyong as being quite impassable for laden mules and almost so for coolies.

It follows the crest of the ridge the whole way, and is generally precipitous and covered with boulders. At Jongchen there is an open space, where 500 men could encamp, and, judging from recent marks of cattle, there was presumably water near. The total distance from Lagyap to Pakyong is 18 miles, and except a possible supply of water at Jongchen, there is none till Shintingla is reached. Consequently no troops could use this road. On the 11th General

Graham continued his march to Pakyong, 12 miles. There was at this time an excellent road nearly the whole way, only a mile on the Gantok side of the Roro Chu remaining to be completed. The 13th Bengal Infantry had made a very serviceable bridge over the Tak-som Chu, and the Public Works Department had erected a more permanent structure over the Roro Chu.

Pakyong, which was garrisoned by 50 men of the 13th Bengal Infantry, had been fortified by a stockade and bank on the side towards Gantok, and mule lines had also been completed.

General Graham reached Padong at noon the following day; the road constructed by the Public Works Department was excellent throughout, distance 14 miles. The division, 9-1, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, and the company, Derbyshire, were huddled on an open airy piece of ground, and were very healthy. Several shops had been opened in the bazar, and the place presented a fairly flourishing appearance. General Graham proposed to make Padong his head-quarters for the present on account of its central position, and the facilities it afforded for directing any movements required in either direction.

The health of the force still continued good. The following are the percentages of sick for the week ending October 14th :—

British Troops	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.70
Native „	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.90
Followers	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.11
Mules	.	.	.	.	.	.	48.96

An uneventful period had now commenced without anything to break its monotony. The troops were for the most part employed in the construction of new roads, and the repairs and improvements of those already existing. In the above operations the following roads were included :—

- (i) The Peapen road, for which the Officer Commanding at Gnathong was ordered to detail a party of 250 Pioneers. This party was, however, reduced to 200 on account of scarcity of tents at Gnathong.
- (ii) The Gantok-Lagyap road, on which the sappers from Gantok and 50 of the 13th Bengal Infantry were employed.
- (iii) A new road from Padong to the junction of the Rushett and Rarhi Chu rivers, which would shorten the distance from Padong to Pakyong by four miles, in addition to avoiding the steep ascent and descent in passing Rhe-nock Bazar. On this road 50 of the 13th Bengal Infantry and the detachment, Derbyshire, were employed.

- (iv) On the 25th orders were issued by General Graham to the Officer Commanding at Gnathong to direct the working party of the Pioneers from the Peapen road to the road leading from Kupup to Jelep, and on the following

day General Graham received orders\* from Army Head-Quarters to commence the road on the Tibetan side of the Jelep pass, to which he replied† that the Pioneers would move over the pass as soon as relieved by the Public Works Department. This movement was effected on the 5th November. The party took up a position on the spur above Benthong and fortified themselves with a wall and *abattis*. No signs of the enemy was met with by their patrols, who proceeded four miles along the Rinchagong road.

\*Tel. No. 8467 A., fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C., Sikkim.

†Tel. No. 1366, dd. Padong, 26th Oct. 88, fm. G. O. C., Sikkim, to Q. M. G.

The cold weather had rendered the adoption necessary of measures with a view to protecting the troops and followers from the severity of the climate.

*Warm clothing.*

Poshteens were ordered for all native ranks of the Gurkhas to Padong, also for the sappers and party of the 13th Bengal Infantry employed on the Lagyap road.

The Chief Commissariat Officer was also authorized to issue warm clothing to transport coolies at Shalambi on the following scale, *viz.*,—

Per man . . . . .	{	1 jersey.
		1 pair pyjamas.
		1 blanket.

Half a dram of rum also per man was sanctioned for the working parties on the Lagyap and new Padong-Pakyong roads. Lastly, orders were issued to the Chief Commissariat Officer to supply all troops at Gnathong with the specially-sanctioned scale of winter clothing.

Meanwhile no news was heard of the Ampa, whose movements continued to be most uncertain.

*The Ampa.*

Owing to the scarcity of forage at Gnathong and the extreme difficulty in procuring grass on account of the snow and frost, General Graham sanctioned the despatch thither of 500 maunds of compressed fodder for the use of the battery and other mules. Eventually, however, having obtained the sanction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the mules were moved down to Sedonchen, where forage was procurable. Sanction was received on the 5th November to construct winter huts for 400 men at Gnathong, and in order to provide the requisite amount of wood it was found necessary to demolish Shalambi, which was accordingly done.

*Scarcity of forage at Gnathong.*

On the 8th November General Graham arrived at Darjeeling to interview the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and receive instructions about future movements. During his stay, which lasted till the 17th November, he heard from Mr. Paul that he had received a letter from the Ampa apologising for his delay, which he ascribed to the shiftiness of the Tibetans.

*News of Ampa.*

The Ampa had at last succeeded in persuading them not to send the Lama army. He proposed to start on the 15th November for Rinchagong, which, he requested, might be telegraphed to the Chinese Minister Wong at Pekin. The preparations for the Ampa's arrival were complete in the Chumbi valley. Large numbers of inhabitants had sent their property into Sikhim to avoid its being requisitioned for his use. Heavy snow fell at Benthong and Gnathong on the 14th, and two days later a report reached General

*Sickness among Benthong detachment.*

Graham that 75 men out of the Benthong detachment were ill with bronchitis brought on by the severity of the weather. The same evening a further report was received stating that 102 men were sick, so the relief of the whole detachment by Gurkhas was directed to be carried out. Warm clothing on an extra special scale was also ordered for the followers at Benthong.

The cold weather being now at hand, it became necessary to decide what steps should be taken to hold Sikhim during the winter months. General Graham's proposals are contained in the following telegram\* :—

\*Tel. No. 1061, Confdl. dd. Padong, 26th Oct. '88, fm. G. O. C., Sikhim, to Q. M. G.

"Snow falls almost daily at Gnathong: cold much increased. Whilst it is not yet known for certain that Ampa has left Lhasa. It is practically impossible to retain present force at Gnathong beyond 15th November. Arrangements for wintering are very desirable. If agreement subsequently come to with Ampa, reduction or withdrawal of force can be carried out. But meanwhile I would recommend movements as follows :—

"Guns to be withdrawn at once to position on line where forage is procurable. Almost none now available at Gnathong. Remainder Gnathong garrison, with exception 400 men, to commence withdrawal to position on Rhenock ridge not later than 10th November. Force left at Gnathong can be hutted suitably, but this work must be commenced as soon as possible; and as it will entail knocking down many existing barracks, troops thus becoming houseless must move down in above positions. Troops can remain as long as required."

Tel. fm. "Chief" to Q. M. G., dd. Derbund, 28th Oct. '88.

\*Letter No. 8602, dd. 29th Oct. '88, fm. Qr. M. G.

With reference to the winter garrison of Sikhim, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that, having regard to the severe climate, the force should consist of Europeans. General Graham's proposals were forwarded\* to the Government of India, which replied† that General Graham might be authorized to carry out, in communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, any partial withdrawal of troops to which His Honour might agree.

† No. 394 S., Simla, 3rd Nov. '88, fm. M. D. to Q. M. G. Tel. No. 8870, 3rd Nov. '88, fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C., Sikhim.



The Lieutenant-Governor, on being referred to, strongly deprecated any withdrawal of troops pending the Ampa's arrival, until bad weather had actually set in. On receiving this, General Graham wired † to Quartermaster-General, urging the necessity of building winter huts for the troops, the difficulty of constructing which would later on be greatly enhanced by cold, snow, &c. To this the Quartermaster-General replied that he might commence hutting at once for about 400 men, and that he was to arrange with Inspector-General of Ordnance, Calcutta, for tents, and Commissary General, Eastern Circle, for whatever supplies he might require. He was also authorized to provide each man and follower with sufficient warm clothing *without regard to any special scale*, so as to ensure thorough protection against the severity of the climate.

† Tel. No. 1144, dd. 4th Nov. '88, fm. G. O. C., Sikkim, to Q. M. G.  
Tel. No. 8917, dd. 5th Nov. '88, fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C., Sikkim.  
No. 8966, dd. 6th Nov. '88, fm. Q. M. G. to G. O. C., Sikkim.

Meanwhile, under instructions from the Military Department, Calcutta, supplies for 400 British (European) troops for four months from December 15th, had been ordered to Gnathong, and agreeably to orders from the Adjutant-General arrangements were made in addition for 600 natives' supplies for a similar period.

Tel. dd. 17th Nov. '88.

To return now to Sikkim. Captain Travers, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, had been on a tour of inspection to Benthong and Gnathong, from which he returned to Padong on the 22nd November. He stated that the Gurkhas were comfortably settled at Benthong, and that the road had been completed to the level of the Langrang lake. On the nearside of the pass an excellent road had been made by the Public Works Department, and a new alignment had been selected from the Kupup to the Tukola pass. As yet the Gurkhas had no sickness. From 9 A.M. to 3 P.M. the weather was pleasant enough, but once the sun got low, he said, it rapidly became cold. The work of building winter huts was being vigorously proceeded with at Gnathong. The size of the fort was also being reduced by one third, so as to be suitable to the reduced garrison. The estimate for the new barracks at Gnathong was received on the 29th

Tel. dd. 19th Nov. '88, Chief's Camp.

*Cost of barracks.* November, amounting to ₹21,722, and was sanctioned by Government on the 3rd January 1889.

Letter 453 S., 3rd Jan. '89, M. D. to Q. M. G.

On the 2nd December General Graham received orders to withdraw all troops, except 400 Derbyshire, from Gnathong. As the force was not at present to return to India, he proposed to distribute the rest of the troops as follows:—

	Rhenock Ridge—9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery.	} in tents.
<i>Location of troops for winter.</i>	„ 2-1st Goorkhas.	
	„ Detachment, Bengal Sappers and Miners	
	Padong— 32nd Pioneers . . . . .	} in huts.
	Pakyong and Guntok—13th Bengal Infantry . . . . .	

The above moves commenced on the 2nd December, and were all to be completed by the 15th.

Tel. No. 278  
F.C., dd. 7th  
Dec. '88, fm.  
Q. M. G. to  
D. Q. M. G.,  
quoting G. O.  
C. Sikkim's  
No. 1302.

On the 3rd December, Mr. Durand accompanied by Mr. Paul arrived at Padong. At the request of the former, General Graham issued orders for 200 Gurkhas to remain for the present at Gnathong, so as to admit of a force of 200 men going to Rinchagong with a similar number in support, should that become politically expedient. Mr. Durand and party left the next day for Pakyong and Gantok.

*Proposed retention of  
200 Gurkhas at Gna-  
thong.*

In consequence of the proposed retention of 200 Gurkhas at Gnathong, in addition to the Derbyshire, it became necessary to construct extra winter barracks. These were at once commenced, their estimated cost was Rs. 3,335, which sum was sanctioned by Government.

*Vide letter  
No. 486 S.,  
dd. 13th Feb.  
'89, fm. M.  
D. to Q. M. G.*

On the 6th December Mr. Elias, Political Officer, wired from Gnathong that a Chinese official of Phari wrote from Rinchagong that he heard that the Ampa reached Gyantze on the 26th November, and was to start for Phari on 4th instant, and stay there some days. Also that two Popens and a Chinese official of Shigatze would arrive at Rinchagong on December 10th, and thence proceed to Gnathong to make a treaty. If they were successful, the Ampa would come to Rinchagong, otherwise he would not advance beyond Phari.

Next day a letter was received from the Ampa, dated Rinchagong, 30th November, in which he stated that he hoped to meet Mr. Paul by December 14th. Another letter was received from the Ampa on the 13th; he had reached Phari the previous day, and requested Mr. Paul would fix a date for an interview,—to which Mr. Paul replied naming the 16th December; yet another letter arrived from the Ampa on the 14th, in which he stated he could not reach Gnathong before the 21st.

At length, on the 21st December, the Ampa actually did reach Gnathong. He arrived at 2 P.M., attended by a large retinue and upwards of 800 coolies, and was received by a guard of honor of the 2-1st Gurkhas and a salute of three guns and was met by Messrs. Paul and Elias and Major Maxwell and staff in the lower camp, where a pavilion had been prepared for his reception. The following day Mr. Paul interviewed the Ampa for three hours. The three Shafis, whom the Ampa was bringing with him, did not arrive on the 21st, but were expected a day or two later. Mr. Durand arrived at Gnathong on the 24th, and on the 26th visited the Jelep. Nothing unusual was seen except numbers of Tibetan coolies bringing in stores for the Ampa. The chief layman of the Tashi-Lumpo monastery with 400 Tibetan coolies reached Gnathong on the 26th. His name was given as Loling. After interviewing the Ampa he left on the 28th.

Nothing of interest occurred till January 10th, when General

Graham heard that negotiations with the Ampa were likely to break down. So he ordered the Gurkhas at Rhenock to be in readiness to move to Gnathong in case the Tibetans should attempt any hostilities after the Ampa's departure. The latest accounts showed about 5,500 men in Chambi, between Galing and the Jelep, and, in the event of negotiations breaking down, the advent of more was threatened. General Graham himself proceeded to Gnathong and arrived there on the 15th January, and owing to the presence of the Ampa, he was met on the road by a company, Derbyshire, and a salute was fired on his arrival. The Ampa announced his intention of leaving Gnathong on the 20th, but on the 17th a telegram from Peking directing him to await further orders at Gnathong, persuaded him to remain. He stated his readiness to give all assurances that the Tibetans would keep the peace, and that none of them would remain on the Sikkim side of Chambi.

He also guaranteed to leave a Chinese guard at Rinchagong, and that either he himself or one of his assistants would remain some time at Rinchagong to arrange trade matters. So long as the Ampa or his assistants remained in the Chumbi valley, Mr. Elias was of opinion that there was no chance of the Tibetans commencing fresh hostilities.

*Telegram from Peking to Ampa.*

The telegram from Peking directed the Ampa not to return to Tibet until the arrival of Mr. Charles Hart, Chinese Commissioner of Customs, who was coming from Peking *via* Calcutta to assist him, and was expected at Gnathong by December 31st. On the 19th December the Ampa left Gnathong for Rinchagong, where he had decided to await Mr. Hart's arrival.

It was decided that the 400 men of the Derbyshire detailed to spend the winter at Gnathong should be relieved by a similar detachment of the Connaught Rangers.

\*They were to go on ordinary relief scale, 66½ lb per man, and †warm clothing, amounting to 23 lb, was being arranged for by General Graham, which was to be issued to them at Siliguri. They were also to come provided with double-fly mountain service tents and single-fly tents for followers.‡

† Tel. No. 9541 of 19th Nov. '88, fm Offr. in charge Q. M. G.'s Office, to G. O. C., Mian Mir.

‡ No. 111 A. Camp of 7th Dec. '88, fm D. Q. M. G., Fort William, to G. O. C., Mian Mir.

§ The relief was finally sanctioned on 15th January 1889. They were only to take with them 40 rounds of ammunition per man, and ||to receive the Derbyshire reserve ammunition on reaching Gnathong, while the Derbyshire on being relieved were to proceed to Jubbulpore.¶

¶ Tel. of 17th No. 1572 Camp Jan. 89, fm A. G. to G. O. C., Lahore.

¶ No. 529 A.C. of 25th Jan. '89, fm. D. Q. M. G., to G. O. C., Sikkim.

Tel. No. 9540  
A. of 19th  
Nov. 88, fm.  
Q. M. G. to  
G. O. C.,  
Sikkim.  
\* Tel. No. 202  
F. C. of 25th  
Nov. 88, fm.  
Q. M. G.,  
Dehra Ghazi  
Khan, to  
Office, Q. M.  
G., Simla.

§ Tel. No. 467.  
S. of 15th  
Jan. 89, fm.  
M. D. to Q.  
M. G.

No. 525 A. C. The Connaught Rangers left Jullunder on the 23rd January 1889  
 of 25th Jan. *en route* for Sikhim; they reached Siliguri on the 29th and started for  
 '89, fm. D. Q. M. G. to M. Gnathong on the 31st.  
 D.

They reached Padong on the 3rd February. The local carriage  
 having broken down, their tents did not arrive; but the men were sheltered in some com-  
*Strength: 7 Officers,*  
*1 Surgeon, 399 rank*  
*and file, 97 followers.* missariat tents, and commissariat transport hav-  
 ing been sent out, succeeded in bringing in 36 tents by 9 P.M.  
 The detachment was halted on the 4th at Padong, and proceeded the  
 next day *en route* to Gnathong, where they arrived safely with their  
 baggage on the 8th February.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and staff reached Padong  
*Visit of H. E. the* on the 8th February. On the following day  
*Commander-in-Chief.* His Excellency inspected the 32nd Pioneers  
 and the hospitals; he then proceeded to Rhenock ridge and in-  
 spected 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, head-quarters 2-1  
 Gurkhas, and detachment 5th Company, Sappers and Miners, after  
 which he returned to Padong, and left the next morning for Siliguri.

The Derbyshire Regiment, strength 11 officers, 383 rank and file,  
*Departure of the Der-* left Gnathong on the 9th February *en route* to  
*byshire.* India, and Jubulpore.

They reached Padong on the 12th and left on the 13th for Kalim-  
 pong. General Graham inspected them prior to their departure.  
 The men all seemed in excellent health.

The percentage of sick the previous week was—

British Troops	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.07
Native "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.30
Followers	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.85
Mules	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.52

Captain Travers having been appointed Aide-de-Camp to His  
 Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, resigned  
*Resignation of Cap-* his appointment of Deputy Assistant Adjutant  
*tain Travers, and ap-* General to the Sikhim Field Force. The ap-  
*pointment of Captain* pointment was then given to Captain Lamb,  
*Lamb as D. A. A. G.* 22nd Punjab Infantry, who arrived at Padong on the 15th February.

Captain Stanton, R.E., having completed the construction of  
 barracks at Gnathong, reached Padong on the 11th February, and  
 on the 19th left for Jullunder, where he had been posted under instruc-  
 tion from Adjutant-General, Simla.

During the last few weeks the falls of snow at Gnathong had been  
*Snow at Gnathong.* so heavy as to prevent the usual reconnoitring  
 and patrol duties from being carried out. On  
 the first February 3 feet of snow were reported in the fort, and again  
 on the 11th and 12th snow fell to a depth of 2 feet, while on the  
 18th there was another heavy fall. In consequence it was found im-

possible to visit the Jelep and Pemberingo passes; but orders were issued that whenever weather permitted the patrols should go out.

One Chinese officer and four soldiers reached Gnathong on the 18th February to escort Mr. Hart from Darjeeling to Chumbi. They were allowed to pass down the line. They experienced great difficulty in crossing the Jelep pass, and only succeeded after three attempts; they took three days to march from Rinchagong to Gnathong, a distance of 12 miles.

At Padong during this period the weather was quite different, and in General Graham's diary we constantly read of "thunderstorms and rain." At Gnathong most of the snow had melted on the southern slopes of the hills by the 10th March; but on the northern slopes it still remained very deep, and the Pemberingo road was quite impassable.

On the 19th March Mr. Hart, the Chinese representative, passed through Padong on his way to Gnathong; he *Arrival of Mr. Hart at Gnathong.* reached the latter place on the 22nd, whither coolies had been despatched by the Ampa to assist him in his journey to Chambi.

On the 19th March General Graham left Padong on a tour of *General Graham goes on inspection tour.* inspection duty for Gantok, where he arrived on the 20th. He inspected the detachment 13th Bengal Infantry, and had an interview with the Raja and Rani of Sikkim. The palace of Gantok had now been placed in a thorough state of repair, re-roofed, cleansed, and whitewashed. And the road to Gantok was in good order and practicable for laden mules throughout. He then returned to Rhenock ridge, where he inspected No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, and head-quarters 2-1st Gurkhas. He then proceeded to Sedonchen, inspecting *en route* the block-houses at Rongli Chu and

Lingtam. At Sedonchen a heavy thunderstorm *Telegraph signaller killed by lightning.* occurred in the evening, during which a military signaller was killed by lightning in the telegraph office, and another suffered a severe shock. A third man was also struck. On this account orders were issued that whenever a thunderstorm appeared to be coming on, the wires should be disconnected and work stopped. Proceeding to Gnathong he inspected the detachments, Connaught Rangers and Gurkhas. While at Gnathong the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and a party of officers visited the top of the Tukola, but nothing unusual was visible. General Graham left Gnathong on the 29th March, and after inspecting the block-houses at Shalambi and Jeluk reached Padong the following day. The troops latterly had been employed on field exercises, wood-cutting, and collecting materials for building huts. The 32nd Pioneers had completed the construction of a rifle range, and had commenced target

practice. The health of troops and followers still continued good, viz.,—

British Troops	.	.	.	.	.	7'60	per cent. sick.
Native "	.	.	.	.	.	2'44	" "
Followers	.	.	.	.	.	0'65	" "
Mules	.	.	.	.	.	9'40	" "

Patrols continued to go at intervals in the direction of the Tukola and Nimla passes, but nothing unusual was seen. The snow beyond the Tukola on the 9th April was reported deep but hard. On the same day two deserters from the 2-1st Gurkhas were apprehended by the Gurkha and Pioneer military police. One man in attempting to escape injured his leg and was brought back in a dooly. With regard to the possible prolonged occupation of Sikkim, the following telegram from the Quartermaster-General to General Graham requests the latter to give his opinion. Both telegram and reply are given in full.

*Telegram from the Offg. Quartermaster-General in India, to BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRAHAM, Commanding Sikkim Expeditionary Force, Padong,—(No. 1519 A Camp [Confidential], dated Fort William, the 7th March 1889.)*

In event of a prolonged occupation of Sikkim, please consider the expediency of taking up a more forward position than our present one, both strategically and for facility of communication with Darjeeling or Chumbi valley, and give me your opinion as soon as you can.

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*From the General Officer Commanding Sikkim Expeditionary Force, to the Offg. Quartermaster-General in India, Fort William, Calcutta,—(No. 82 [Confidential], dated Camp, Padong, the 15th March 1889.)*

With reference to your telegram No. 1519 A. (Camp), and after consultation with the Political Officer, I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, in the event of its becoming necessary to occupy Sikkim for a prolonged period, it would perhaps be more advantageous to have the main body of the troops in some place with a better climate than Gnathong—more easy of access, and better placed strategically. Sathala, shown in the pocket-handkerchief map as close to the main road from Gantok to Tumlong, and about half-way between the two, appears to me the position I would select. Its advantages are—

- 1st—The elevation is 5,000 feet above the sea, and therefore it would be a suitable climate throughout the year.
- 2ndly—It is within easy reach of Tumlong and Gantok, and on the direct road to the Chola pass, and also covers the roads into Darjeeling and the bridges over the Teesta.

3rdly—With an advanced post at Barfouchen in the Dik Chu valley, on the Chola road, near the point where it is intersected by the road from Tiphu and Gainsalachas, any movement of the Tibetans from Rinchagong towards Gnathong could be cut off by an advance over the Chola to Chumbi, and Gnathong itself could be reached *via* Tiphu, Pheapsu, and Kupup.

4thly—Barfouchen is 11,000 feet, and only about 16 miles from Sathala, whereas Gnathong is 12,300, and upwards of 22 miles from Rhenock ridge.

5thly—From information received from the Political Officer, I am led to believe that the road from Barfouchen to the Chola is a steady rise up the Dik Chu valley, on the face of a hill which would easily permit of a good road being made,—Barfouchen itself being in a large open valley, with a good water-supply, good timber, and well situated for a defensive position. The road between the Chola to Chumbi is a much better one than the Jelep-Rinchagong road, the jungle is less dense along the whole length of it, and there are no bridges that could be destroyed. (On the Jelep-Rinchagong road, the river had to be crossed eight times by bridges, four of which had been destroyed by the Tibetans on the 25th September, the repairs to which delayed the column some hours.)

6thly—The highest point on the Sathala-Barfouchen road is Fieungong, 12,130 feet, as against Lingtu on the Gnathong road, 12,617 feet.

7thly—A force placed at Sathala is, as it were, in the heart of Sikkim, whereas at Rhenock ridge and Gnathong it is quite on the border of the country.

Against all these advantages remain the facts that very substantial huts have been built at Gnathong, an excellent road has been made the whole way, and the line of telegraph exists; that it has been proved that troops can remain there in the winter without suffering; and that communication with Gnathong has never been altogether interrupted.

A very good cart-road has been made from Siliguri to Kalimpong, along which the whole of the supplies are now being sent; this road would still have to be used to supply Sathala, for although a much shorter road to that place exists *via* the Cane bridge over the Rangit, Namchi, Temi, and Samdong, it is altogether out of repair, and the bridges over the Rangit and Teesta are too weak to be of any use.

The garrison of Gnathong could not be withdrawn until the other line was thoroughly established, and even then I doubt whether it would be advisable to abandon it altogether. It is most important that the Sathala-Chola road should be opened out and put into thorough repair; and for a prolonged occupation of Sikkim, I would suggest the following garrison:—

- 1 Battalion, Native Infantry, Head-Quarters, Sathala;
- 1 Company, Tumlong;
- $\frac{1}{2}$  Company, Gantok;
- $\frac{1}{2}$  Company, Pakyong;
- 2 Companies; Barfouchen; and
- 200 Europeans at Gnathong.

A certain number, say, 200 Europeans and 600 Natives, might be kept in reserve in the Presidency, to be pushed up in support, if required. The guns at Jallaphar would also be available.

*Memo. from the Officer Commanding Sikkim Expeditionary Force, to the Offg. Quartermaster-General in India,—(No. 88 [Sikkim], dated Camp Padong, the 18th March 1889.)*

The following is forwarded, in continuation of this office No. 82, Confidential, dated 15th March 1889. It would appear that before this line could be taken up, a good deal of road-making and bridging would be required. Further enquiries are being made regarding water-supply.

#### No. I.

*Report on portion of road now under construction by the Political Officer from Gantok to Tumlong.*

First section, Gantok, height 5,800 feet; to Penlong-la, height 6,250 feet—total distance about 5 miles.

A good 8-foot road; passable for laden mules for first  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles, nearly level; from that point at intervals there are places where only foot-passengers can go, crossing on bamboos laid from stone to stone; coolies are now at work on the road.

The last  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile is a gradual ascent to the pass of about 1 in 8; streams of water are frequently met with, and bamboo grass in abundance, especially towards Penlong-la.

#### No. II.

*Report on existing road from Penlong-la to Runkpo, via Satak and Sathala.*

From the Penlong-la this road strikes off at once due north, down hill, whilst the new road to Tumlong runs north-west from the pass.

After two miles rather steep descent, in some places over large boulders, the village of Satak is reached; this consists of about 8 houses, with fields cultivated round about; chickens, milk, butter, and eggs are procurable here.

From Satak to the bridge over the Dik Chu river is another mile, steeper and more rocky than before.

The height of Penlong-la is 6,250 feet, and the height of the bridge over the Dik Chu river is 3,950 feet, thus we have a descent of 2,300 feet, and, in order to obtain a gradual slope of not more than  $\frac{1}{10}$ , the road would have to be made  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles long. The bridge is a rough structure of long bullocks, stretched across and resting on rocks on either side, with bamboo railings, and would certainly be washed away in the rains.

From the Dik Chu River to Sathala, the top of the ridge is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, of steep ascent, passing the village of Lingcham; and from Sathala to Runkpo is another  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile along the ridge. There is very little water at Lingcham, and none at all on the ridge at Sathala. If it were required at any time to move any large body of troops along this road, with anything except coolie transport, it would be necessary to re-line it the whole way—from the Penlong-la to the Dik Chu river—in order to obtain an easy gradient; this would probably take a working party of 200 men about one month to complete.

In order to stand during the rains, a more permanent bridge would be required over the Dik Chu river; this might either be undertaken by the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, or constructed by the Field Engineer, with the assistance of hired sawyers and carpenters.



The road up from the Dik Chu river to Sathala would also require to be re-lined in some parts, and would probably take a working party of 100 men about 15 days to complete; for use during the rains the road would require paving throughout.

The existing road is quite good enough for foot traffic and for coolies carrying loads, and by it the distance from Gantok to Runkpo is about  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

The new road from Gantok to Tumlong will cross the Dik Chu river by a bridge somewhere near its junction with the Bokchachu river, and when this bridge is completed, from that point, if it were thought desirable, a road might be taken up the spur to Sathala and Runkpo, which would be used alike by parties moving up towards the Chola pass from Tumlong or Gantok, or coming from Darjeeling by the direct road over the Teesta by the Samdong bridge.

### No. III.

Runkpo consists of one well-built house in good repair, with a wooden floor raised about 3 feet from the ground, bamboo shingle roof, capable of holding about 30 men; with two sheds, which are used as cook-houses or stables.

There is an open grassy plot of about 50 yards square, suitable for camping ground.

Bamboo for fodder grows near, but not in abundance.

Water-supply is half a mile below; it consists of a spring rising out of the ground, but contains only enough water for 50 men. Except during, and just after, the rains, there is no water along this spur, from Runkpo past Fieungong, until you get down to the Dik Chu river; again, during the rains there are pools of water collected at various places, where the inhabitants graze their cattle.

Milk, butter, eggs, and fowls are brought in to Runkpo from the villages about.

A. E. SANDBACH, *Lieut., R.E.,*  
*Field Engineer.*

GANTOK,

*The 16th March 1889.*

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The following is a letter from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to His Excellency the Governor General, stating General Chesney's and his own proposals for the occupation of a more suitable position in Sikhim:—

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—For your information. General Chesney sends me a note for consideration to the following effect.

He considers we are committed to maintaining a garrison in Sikhim for an indefinite time, and thinks the force should take up a better position than that now held at Gnathong, which is difficult and expensive to keep supplied.

Suggests a better line, both as regards climate and facility of supply, as also strategically, would be from Gantok or the ridges in rear of it towards the Chola pass leading directly towards Chumbi.


He maintains a force in this position would be able to descend at once into the Chumbi valley, and could turn the flank of any force of the enemy attempting to advance in the direction of Rinchagong and Gnathong.

I have asked General Graham his opinion, and he promises reply in a few days.

Now that the Pakyong-Enchi road is so good, troops on the Chola line could certainly be supplied more easily than on the Gnathong position, as the Lingtu

ascent would be avoided. Tumlong, the capital, would also be better protected against a raid over the Chola pass.

Best position apparently would be—



W. G.,—16-3-89.

The Honourable General Chesney's proposal to abandon Gnathong and place our troops at Gantok, or on the ridges in rear of it leading directly towards Chumbi *via* the Chola pass, is based on the difficulty and expense of occupying a position 12,000 feet high, and on the possibility of our having to garrison Sikhim for an indefinite time.

The question seems to me to be mainly a political one. From a military point of view, we should benefit by having our soldiers at a lower altitude and nearer the base of supplies, but it is a mistake to suppose that for offensive operations the Chola pass is so convenient, under existing conditions, as the Jelep pass. At present the road is a mere track for some distance on this side, and the country across the passes is quite unknown, whilst its having no lateral communications with any of the southern passes is also an objection. If, however, it be decided to abandon Gnathong, I would recommend that the line Gantok—Pakyong—Padong be held, and that the road from Gantok to the Nathula pass and the branch road connecting this with the Jelep pass on our side be put into repair as soon as possible. The force from Gantok would then be in a position to threaten the rear of any hostile force which might occupy Gnathong or Lingtu. I would not give up Gnathong, however, until the above roads have been made practicable for laden mules.

With this retired line, and with a force of 200 British and 600 Native soldiers held in readiness at the Presidency, with transport available at Siliguri, I think the force in Sikhim might safely be reduced, and that it would suffice to maintain there—

- 4 Companies of British Infantry,
- 2 Regiments of Native Infantry (the 13th Bengal Infantry being made up to full strength).

This would release the battery, which might return to Darjeeling, ready to proceed to the front, whenever required, and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, which might return to Dharmsala without being relieved.

The fort at Gnathong should be completely destroyed on abandonment.

F. R.

OODEYPUR,

19th March 1889.

The following letter from General Officer Commanding Sikhim, to Quartermaster General, states the former's views on arrangements to be made in view of the intended advance into the Chumbi valley:—

*From the General Officer Commanding Sikhim Expeditionary Force, to the Offg. Quartermaster-General in India,—(No. 89, dated Camp, Padong, Sikhim, 1st April 1889.)*

With reference to your No. 2052 A., Camp,\* "Confidential," dated 26th March 1889, I have the honour to submit my views on the arrangements which would have to be made in the event of operations being decided upon beyond Sikhim into the Chumbi valley, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India.

\* Forwarding copy of Military Department No. 510-S. of 22nd March 1889.

1. If the occupation is not to extend beyond Phari, I would suggest 1,500 infantry and 4 guns as being the minimum with which I should advance into the Chumbi valley.

2. That 1,000 infantry and 2 guns remain in support at Gnathong, and the wing 13th Bengal Infantry be employed at Gantok and towards the Chola.

3. A reserve of 200 European and 600 Native infantry might be held in readiness in India to move if required.

4. The advanced force would consist of 4 guns, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, 400 Connaught Rangers, 700 Pioneers, and 400 Gurkhas; the support at Gnathong of 2 guns, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, and another battalion from India.

5. As it would be absolutely necessary to take tents, the transport required would be at least 1,800 mules, of which there are only 700 in Sikhim.

6. I am of opinion that, owing to the present good state of the road, the knowledge of the country, and the fact that the troops that would be required for the advance are already on the line, it would be much better that the advance should be made by the Gnathong-Jelep road. The Gantok-Barfauchen road is very little known; and from reports received from officers who have been as far as Fieungong, the existing road is very bad, and the water-supply until the valley of the Dik-Chu is reached is very scanty. In addition to this, from the last account received from the Political Officer, the road from the Chola to Chumbi seems to be quite as long as that from the Jelep to Chumbi.

7. The advance should be made as soon after the 15th May as possible.

The proposed advance into the Chumbi valley was, however, postponed. And it was decided that no advance should be made at any rate before the setting in of the rainy season, unless the Tibetans should again take up a threatening attitude, in which event the situation would be reconsidered.

No. 538S. dd.  
29th April '89,  
fm. M. D. to  
Q. M. G.

*Transport and Supply*

The original force for which transport was required consisted of—

G. G. O. No. 169, dd. 25th Feb. '88.	9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery . . . . .	4 guns.
	2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment . . . . .	200 men.
	Head-Quarters Wing, 13th Bengal Infantry . . . . .	400 „
	32nd Pioneers . . . . .	(about) 700 „

The description of transport to be used was, as far as possible, to be mules, supplemented by coolies. There were two routes by which the frontier of Sikkim might be approached, *viz.* :—

(i) The route from Siliguri *via* the Teesta valley to the suspension bridge.

(ii) The route *via* Ghoom, a station on the Darjeeling Railway.

By the former route an excellent cart-road was available as far as the suspension bridge, and by the second a good “pack” road for coolies and mules. With reference to route (i) Captain Mansfield, Assistant Commissary General, writes :—

“After the end of March the road *via* the Teesta valley will be impracticable for stores for the following reasons, *viz.*, the road through the Teesta valley, always an unhealthy one, becomes so malarious when the weather gets hot and showers of rain begin to fall, which may be expected next month (March), that the carters will not work along it, and it is only by offering very high wages that the Department Public Works expect to be able to carry on their work on the road after the end of March.

“The hill-men who come down to the plains in the cold weather to bring up their supplies for the hot months are doing so now, as they will not pass through the Terai after the end of March at the latest, and this fact will affect in a very serious degree the amount of coolie and pony traffic available from the Teesta bridge to Padong.

“Siliguri itself” (should it be used as a base) “is a most unhealthy spot when once the heat begins, and neither Europeans or Natives will keep in health, more especially in tents, for there are no houses available. I am therefore of opinion that if an expedition is to take place next month, all supplies for it should be pushed on to Padong now; and that at the end of March the base should be changed from Siliguri to Ghoom. From Ghoom supplies could be sent by local coolie and pony traffic and by convoys of Government mules to Pashok, 14 miles, where there is a good camping ground and water; and thence *via* the Teesta bridge to Kalimpong, 9 miles.

“This route would have the following advantages over the Teesta valley route, *viz.*, Europeans and Natives would be in a good climate (*viz.*, Ghoom). The Teesta valley bridge establishments need not remain there, and the godown at the bridge can be done away with. The muleteers and subordinates in charge of convoys would not have to sleep at the Teesta bridge, as is now the case, but would sleep at Pashok.

“The local coolies and pony-men would not have the same objection to carrying from Ghoom to Padong, as they would have to carrying from the Teesta bridge to Padong. As in the former case, they would not have to sleep in the Teesta valley. The difficulties regarding cart transport would be avoided.

“The Darjeeling Railway would take stores to Ghoom probably at some reduction on their usual freight charges, if I was empowered to make an arrange-

ment with them that all stores after a certain date would be despatched *via* Ghoom. Stores could be stacked within 100 yards of the railway station at Ghoom and on a flat place above it which is within cantonment limits, and standing-room for mules coming to fetch stores might be obtained close by. If sheds were required for protection of stores, I am informed by the subdivisional officer of the Department Public Works that they could be erected at a small cost with materials which could be afterwards utilised for other purposes.

"The Government mules could be kept at Padong and worked backwards and forwards as they were available.

"I would, however, represent that keeping any body of troops larger than, say, 300 or 400 natives in advance of Kalimpong during the rains, would be a very serious undertaking, if the mules now on the line were working with them on account of the almost total absence of local carriage for keeping the troops supplied with rations and the mules with grain.

"Sheds would have to be erected for stores at Pashok, Kalimpong, Padong, and at *every halting place* until the troops were reached, as owing to the very heavy rainfall in these regions, the stores would become unfit for consumption."

Brigadier-General Graham, Commanding the Sikhim Expeditionary Force, wrote to the Quartermaster-General, urging the necessity, in the event of Siliguri being retained as the base depôt of the Sikhim Field Force, of the construction of huts for all European and Native sick who might have to remain there. These huts were to be raised on piles at least 6 feet above the ground. At the same time he remarked that the removal of the depôt to Ghoom would obviate the necessity of building huts, &c.

The above-quoted letter\* from Assistant Commissary-General at Siliguri was forwarded on to the Government of India from the Office of the Quartermaster-General in India,† with a request that sanction might be granted to Officer Commanding Sikhim for the erection of such sheds as might be necessary for the storage of supplies.

To which the Government of India replied as follows‡:—

"There is no objection to the removal of the base depôt from Siliguri to Ghoom whenever the Officer Commanding Sikhim Field Force considers it necessary, and the Government of India empower Colonel Graham to order the erection of any sheds on the route that may be necessary."

The total number of transport mules employed with the Sikhim Field Force was obtained from the following sources:—

From Calcutta . . . . .	22
„ Meerut . . . . .	13
„ Agra . . . . .	26
„ Bareilly . . . . .	150
„ Umballa . . . . .	400
„ Rawal Pindi . . . . .	550
„ Peshawur . . . . .	370

TOTAL . 1,531

No. 5, dd.  
Siliguri,  
'88, fm. O. C.,  
Sikhim, to  
Q. M. G.

\*Viz., No. 5E.  
of 23rd  
Feb. '88, to  
C. C. O.,  
Calcutta.  
† No. 1541  
A. C., dd.  
13th March  
'88, to M. D.  
‡ No. 131 S.  
of 19th  
March '88, fm.  
M. D. to  
Q. M. G.

In addition to the above there were 92 ordnance mules belonging to 9-1, Northern Division, Royal Artillery. On the 12th March the disposition and condition of the mules was as follows:—

	Effective.	Sick.
Padong . . . . .	463	40
„ 9-1, Northern Division, Royal Artillery	89	3
Rongli Chu . . . . .	114	5
Kalimpong . . . . .	192	...
Siliguri . . . . .	675	8
<b>TOTAL</b> .	<b>1,533</b>	<b>56</b>

giving a percentage of sick 3·53.

When Brigadier-General (then Colonel) Graham reached Siliguri on the 6th March, he found that Captain Mansfield, Chief Commissariat Officer, was sending on stores satisfactorily by means of country carts to Teesta, and thence forward by mules.

Both wings, 32nd Pioneers, had been sent on with mule carriage. On the 7th two batches of mules, 300 strong each, arrived from Peshawur and Rawal Pindi respectively. They were in good condition, and, on the whole, a satisfactory lot, though they included several small ones. The batch from Rawal Pindi were sent in small trucks, on which General Graham remarks:—

“Though they arrived safely, it is most desirable that larger trucks should, as a rule, be used. The mules could with ease have jumped over the bar and out of the truck had they wished to do so. Moreover, the space between the cross-bar and the end of the trucks was only barely sufficient to allow of the mules being put in, and they could not stand with any comfort.”

*The evils of small railway trucks.*

The same evening a telegram was received from Mr. Paul in answer to General Graham's question, that there was no political objection to moving supplies at once on to Rhenock ridge. This plan carried a twofold advantage with it,—*firstly*, the stores would be more handy in case of an advance; and, *secondly*, the difficulty which had already begun to be felt of obtaining forage for all the mules at Padong, would be removed. On reaching Teesta bridge on the 8th March, General Graham found the commissariat stores being rapidly pushed up to Padong—2,000 maunds had been despatched in the previous three days, and orders were sent to the Chief Commissariat Officer to send on half the stores to Rhenock ridge as soon as possible. *The space at Teesta bridge was very confined, there being no regular camping ground.* The commissariat stores, as they were brought up by carts, were placed at the side of the road, there being no other place available.

So far the transport appears to have been working satisfactorily.

*Italian mules.*

A mule died at Teesta on the 17th; it was one of a batch bought in Italy, none of which appear to have been a success; the animal had a stroke of paralysis and had to be shot. The following day, during the march from Rongli to Lingtan, a mule fell and broke its neck, and another had its leg

*Persian headstalls.*

broken by a kick, which accident General Graham attributes to the Persian headstalls with which many of them had been supplied—

"These," he says, "are quite unsuitable to the hills, where ground is limited, and in fact I should be sorry to have to use them anywhere."

Bamboo fodder was found in abundance at Lingtam.

The ascent from Lingtam to Sedonchen was found to be very abrupt, and terribly slippery. It was most trying for the transport animals, who, however, came along well and got into camp in good time. The coolies do not appear to have been very reliable, for 17 of them bolted during the night of the 19th, but luckily Mr. Paul was able to replace them. Bamboo fodder at Sedonchen also was found to be plentiful. During the advance on fort Lingtu the mules suffered severely from the cold and wet and the bad state of the roads. Yet up to the end of the week, 26th March, only ten mules had been lost; most of these had fallen down precipices and been killed, but one or two died of cold and wet combined. We have seen that General Graham was empowered to move the base depôt from Siliguri to Ghoom whenever he should deem it advisable, and he accordingly decided on doing this

*Difficulties and misunderstandings regarding supplies.*

as soon as the supplies up to the 14th May had left Siliguri. There seems to have been a good deal of misunderstanding with regard to these supplies.

The Commissary General-in-Chief wired to General Graham that Government had only sanctioned supplies for Europeans to the 14th April and for Natives to the end of the month; this the Government of India distinctly denied, and forwarded to General Graham a copy of a telegram sent by them to the Commissary General, Eastern Circle, directing him to forward any supplies that he (General Graham might demand.

Even when this difficulty was got over, the Commissary General, Eastern Circle, wired that he would forward no more supplies until he received instructions from General Officer Commanding Sikhim, in order to avoid accumulation, albeit these instructions had already been issued. These delays in supplies, General Graham says, were most disheartening, for if supplies thus ordered could be detained, no reliance could be placed on their arriving.

When, however, the supplies were forwarded, Captain Mansfield,

by utilising the Intchi column carriage, had been able to lay out stages of mules sufficient to bring through two days' supplies daily. Coolies were employed on the stages Dolepchen, Rongli, and Lingtam, as they worked well there, and preferred being in the warmer climate and farther from the frontier.

The commissariat mules which were at Sedonchen were in capital condition and full of work; the climate there suited them, and there was abundance of forage.

At Shalambi also forage was plentiful, but the mules there seemed to feel the cold.

The regimental and battery transport mules were obliged to stay there; but to mitigate the effects of the cold wind, sheds were erected for them near the bamboo. Notwithstanding these precautions, the animals continued to feel the cold, so that on the 25th April they were all ordered down to Sedonchen. The bad weather and the heavy state of the roads were trying them severely. Three mules died during the week, still the percentage of sick (mules) was only 5·5 per cent. The worst parts of the road were between Sedonchen and Kenlaka and Kenlaka and Garnei, notwithstanding the efforts that were made to keep it in repair.

Orders had recently been issued for the movement of the force at Rhenock to Padong, but the movement was delayed owing to a strike amongst the coolies for higher pay, which had to be granted.

See Diary.

On the 27th May General Graham writes:—

“The transport shows signs of the severity of the strain upon it. Many mules, although not shown as sick, are really hardly able to carry their loads. The prevailing complaint is sore-feet, due to the hoofs getting worn away from working on the stony portions of the road after having been employed on the muddy ones. It is, however, impossible to avoid changing them, as after mules have been at work for a few days on the heavy portion, they become worn out and must be granted a certain amount of rest by being transferred to where they have an easier time. I am endeavouring to obtain coolies to run up sheds for the mules at the various stages: unless this is done, I fear the mortality will shortly be very serious; as unless under cover at night they never get a chance of being dry, as their “jhools” get wet during the day and have hardly ever been dry for several weeks.”

Percentage of sick on 27th May 7·79 per cent.

What General Graham anticipated in the above extract from his diary came to pass, for during the next week the percentage of sick among the mules rose from 7·79 to 20·42 per cent.—an alarming increase. And, notwithstanding that the transport staff did their utmost in every way to attend to their wants, there was no prospect of the number of sick decreasing.

The building of huts for them was rapidly going on, and a kind of waterproof sheet had been constructed for each mule, by cutting up waterproof bags. Still it was not to be expected that these



measures could altogether counteract the effects of the climate. The Chief Commissariat Officer reported that it was frequently the healthiest-looking mules that died, being seized apparently with a stroke of paralysis.

The following extract from a letter written by the Officer Commanding Sikkim, to the Quartermaster-General, expresses very clearly the condition and requirements of the transport at this period :—

No. 18 K.  
dd. 24th  
May '88,  
from O. C.,  
Sikkim,  
to Q. M. G.

(i) "The transport originally provided for the Sikkim Expeditionary Force was 1,531 mules and 500 coolies. Out of the above, 43 mules have died, 150 are sick and out of the remaining 1,338 mules about 350 are unfit, through weakness, for duty on several of the worst stages on the line, so that the good mules working on these stages have no relief.

(ii) "The number of mules available for the carriage of stores required by this (the Lingtu) column is further reduced by the necessity of retaining 80 mules at Pakyong for transport of 2 companies, 13th Bengal Infantry. There are thus some 1,250 mules available for carriage of stores of this column, from which if 10 per cent. spare be deducted, 1,225 remain, giving with the 300 coolies now available a carrying power of 2,550 maunds, which, divided among the eight stages between Padong and Gnathong, enables them to carry on an average 310 maunds a day, or 9,300 maunds a month,—that is to say, supposing stores are always ready at Padong and the transport is not wanted for any other purposes.

(iii) "In addition to the month's supplies of the force, which come to about 6,500 maunds, there are four months' supplies for the Pioneers from the 1st July to 31st October to be brought up, and which come roughly to a similar amount. So that supposing the maximum amount of stores possible were lifted from Padong, the whole of the stores for the Pioneers and for the remainder of the force could not possibly be landed in Gnathong until towards the end of June, always supposing that there were no calls on transport mules for other purposes, and that all mules now available should remain efficient—which cannot possibly be the case.

(iv) "Having in view my contemplated advance beyond Gnathong, the carriage of supplies will be more difficult, as not only will an advance occupy a large portion of the transport available, which is now being utilised on convoy duty, but the length of the communications will be increased and so further reduce the carrying powers.

(v) "The carriage of stores from the base at Ghoom is another subject for serious consideration; owing to the rainy weather, which has already commenced, and the demand for coolies for work in Darjeeling and the tea gardens, the supply of local carriage is steadily decreasing, and during the last eight days an average of only 270 maunds of stores has been despatched from Ghoom, and it may reasonably be expected that this average will show a still further decrease as the rainy season advances.

(vi) "It is impossible that mule transport intended for the equipment of troops can be utilised further from the front than is at present the case, as if an advance be made, some days' delay in bringing up transport must necessarily ensue before the force can move. I would therefore suggest that the civil authorities, Darjeeling, be urged to use every means at their disposal to furnish sufficient carriage (if necessary impressing it), to enable supplies to be pushed forward from Ghoom with greater expedition than is at present the case.

(vii) "I have addressed the Commissary-General, Eastern Circle, and have asked that the mule transport with the force under my command may be supplemented by 500 mules.

(viii) "There is another point to which I wish to invite attention, namely, the entire inadequacy of the mule and other transport at present available, should the contemplated advance be made by this column, and should the necessity arise at the same time for moving the force now at Padong and Pakyong in the direction of Gantok. To accomplish this latter object, it would be necessary to detach a large number of the mules now carrying stores for this column from Padong, thus rendering the carrying of stores by mules from Padong and Gnathong in addition to those required for the equipment of a force advancing from Gnathong with its supplies difficult, if not impossible.

(ix) "I would also point out that the original calculations regarding transport required for this expedition only provided for transport for equipment of troops and for carriage of ten days' supplies for the force; and that in addition to 1,500 mules originally estimated for, orders were given for the entertainment of a coolie corps of 2,000 coolies, only about 500 of which have ever been employed, and the numbers of which have now been reduced to about 300, it having been found impossible to obtain more men.

(x) "I may state that I am fully prepared to advance on Chumbi for a few days, provided the remainder of the force at Padong and Pakyong remains stationary; and the remarks made above are only intended to demonstrate the disadvantages the force is labouring under owing to insufficiency of transport, and the extremely bad roads and weather."

Letter  
No. 3086A. of  
2nd June  
'88, fm. Q. M.  
G. to M. D.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that it was undesirable to increase the mule transport; as, subsequent to the despatch of the above letter, General Graham had received orders not to advance to Chumbi, but that the Local Government should be asked to procure an additional number of coolies to supplement the transport.

No. 188, dd.  
Gnathong, 1st  
June '88.  
No. 18R. of  
24th May,  
'88, to Q.  
M. G.

General Graham telegraphed to Quartermaster-General on the 2nd June, in continuation of his letter, urging afresh the necessity for the immediate despatch of 500 mules, as coolie carriage on the Gnathong side of Padong was most unreliable, and the civil authorities were unable to supply the number required, or to prevent wholesale desertion amongst those they did procure. Meanwhile, the strain upon both mules and drivers was becoming very severe, and eight of the latter had deserted.

General Graham wired on the 3rd June that 70 mules had died up to date, of which 23 deaths had occurred during the current week. He strongly urged that all mules which showed signs of breaking down should be sent back to India, otherwise they would most certainly die, and not only would the loss to Government be very great, but the transport of supplies would be seriously interfered with. To enable these steps to be carried out, General Graham now asked

for 1,000 fresh mules instead of the 500 for which he had already applied.

"The mules," he says, "of this force are so worn out by the constant work and exposure to which they have been subjected during the last four months, that I believe that a very large number of them will not live through the rains, and I consider that their relief as now proposed will in the end prove the most economical solution of the question."

While the above was being written, the Quartermaster-General's telegram\* arrived, stating that it was impossible to add to the number of mules with the force, but that the Bengal Government had wired stating that arrangements were in hand to improve the communications and strengthen the transport.

On reading the above, General Graham continued his telegram, stating that the "strengthening of transport" by the Bengal Government only referred to the Ghoom-Padong road, and further pointing out that reinforcements of transport, either in the shape of mules or coolies, were absolutely necessary between Padong and Gnathong. Also that, from what he could ascertain, coolies were not locally procurable, only 270 being employed on the Padong-Gnathong road.

\*It having been decided that the Derbyshire detachment, and 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, should be withdrawn, supplies for the 32nd Pioneers at Gnathong for July, August, September and †October had been despatched to Ghoom by the 8th June, and for the whole force up to the end of June. Of these supplies, four-fifths had already gone forward from Ghoom, and the balance was being moved on at the rate of 500 maunds daily. Hired transport was being worked from Ghoom to Kalimpong, and beyond that place mules and coolies.

The detachment of the Derbyshire was to be temporarily accommodated at Ghoom after their withdrawal from Sikhim.

After the Derbyshire and 9-1, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, had been withdrawn from Sikhim, and supplies for the remainder had been sent up, it was proposed by the Quartermaster-General to entertain 250 mules at Gnathong for the 32nd Pioneers, 250 at Padong for the wing, 13th Bengal Infantry, and 250 at Ghoom for 200 men of the Derbyshire.

"The weekly return ending June 10th showed 1,439 mules with the Sikhim Expedition, of which 611 were unfit, 21 mules having died during the week.".....

"It is now proposed to send 250 fresh mules to Gnathong, 250 to Padong, and to select 250 of the best now in Sikhim for retention at Ghoom, withdrawing the remainder. Early orders of Government are requested as to whether 500 fresh mules may be sent."

\*This proposal was sanctioned by Government, but instead of 250 mules, General Graham considered 520 necessary at Ghoom for the transport of the Derbyshire, 9-1, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, hospital, and seven days' supplies to Gnathong; in case of need the 500 fresh mules were to be supplied as follows:—†

Eastern Circle . . . . .	70 mules.
Peshawur, Pindi and Sirhind . . . . .	430 „
	<hr/>
TOTAL . . . . .	500 „
	<hr/>

A lengthy correspondence now ensued between General Graham, the Commissary General-in-Chief, of the Quartermaster-General, and the Government of India, as to how many mules it was really advisable to maintain with the Sikhim Force. Government decided that it was unnecessary to maintain the 1,020 mules as proposed by General Graham, and that 500 mules at Gnathong and Padong, with a certain number at Ghoom to forward the detachment Derbyshire, would be ample. Also that the number required should be made up from the best mules then in Sikhim, the balance being returned to India: thus obviating the necessity of sending up 500 fresh mules. When once the four months' supplies were laid in, and shelter provided for the mules to be retained, the chief causes of the excessive mortality and break-downs among the animals would be removed. It was now proposed to maintain only 300 mules at Ghoom, which would provide transport for—

Kits, tents, ammunition, cooking utensils, &c., for	
200 British troops . . . . .	116 mules.
For complete Native field hospital] . . . . .	100 „
For a section British „ „ . . . . .	38 „
Fifteen days' rations for 200 British troops . . . . .	46 „
	<hr/>
	300 mules.
	<hr/>

General Graham wired to Quartermaster General on the 30th June that the Chief Commissariat Officer with the Sikhim Force reported that he could supply, from the mules then with the force, the full number of 1,020, which he (General Graham) had originally asked for, provided that the mules could get from a month to six weeks' rest. The mules had been greatly benefited by the two or three weeks' rest which they had already had, far more so even than the Chief Commissariat Officer had anticipated. Under these circumstances, General Graham enquired whether Government would sanction the location of these mules at Ghoom, huts being erected for their reception.

The Chief Commissariat Officer, Presidency, stated that he could arrange fodder for them at Ghoom at a cheaper rate than at Padong.

Another estimate for the number of mules to be maintained at Ghoom was made by the Chief Commissariat Officer, and is quoted by (i) General Graham in his telegram, which makes the total number 480, or deducting 157 battery mules, 323, and this number was now fixed upon; the total now to be maintained being 824. (ii) Those at Ghoom were all to be hutted. Accommodation for 115 was already available, and Government sanctioned (iii) the expenditure of ₹3,200 for the hutting of the remaining 209 mules. In view, however, of the contemplated reinforcement of the Sikkim force by 200 Derbyshire and 9/1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, General Graham considered it desirable to have the huts erected at Padong instead of Ghoom, which could be done for ₹1,000. The Commissary-General, Eastern Circle, (iv) sanctioned this outlay, it being within the sum that had been sanctioned by Government for the erection of huts. Taking into consideration the number of mules returned as sick, *viz.*, 49·43 per cent., the Commissary General-in-Chief (v) wrote to the Quartermaster-General, questioning whether full attention had been paid to proper loading, and the prevention of over-loading. To which the Quartermaster-General replied as follows (vi): That he was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to state that in His Excellency's opinion the debilitated condition of the mules was due in a great measure to the excessive work they had had to perform owing to forced marches, also to their being for so long without shelter, and having to stand the heavy strain without relief. The Commissary General-in-Chief's letter 672 T. and the Quartermaster-General's reply, 6955 A., were both forwarded to General Graham under cover of Quartermaster-General's No. 6956A. of 21st September 1888, who replied as follows:—(vii)

(1) " . . . Since the commencement of this expedition, the closest attention has been paid to the loading of the transport animals, and to the prevention of over-loading. Stringent orders have been from time to time issued on the subject, and any one found infringing them has been severely dealt with.

(2) "The forced marches alluded to were unavoidable, and averaged only about 7—8 miles.

"In addition to the causes alluded to by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I would observe that one very fruitful source of sore-back is the very steep gradient of many of the Sikkim roads, which makes it almost impossible to prevent the loads from shifting, with the almost invariable result of causing a gall."

The percentage of sick mules which, owing to the heavy work entailed by the transport of the Gurkhas, Derbyshire and 9-1 Northern Division, Royal Artillery, to Gnathong during the heavy rains, had risen on August 19th to 52·67 per cent., gradually decreased, until on the 23rd September only 31·94 per cent. of the mules were

reported sick. During the advance over the Tibetan passes to Chumbi on the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th September, the strain on the mules owing to the bad weather and indescribably bad state of the road was such, that the percentage of sick on the return of the party speedily rose again to 48·96 per cent. From that period the sick gradually began to recover, till on the 30th December there were only 7·68 per cent. sick mules.

The following is the percentage of sick among the mules of the Sikkim Field Force from April 22nd, 1888, to April 7th, 1889:—

April	22nd, 1888	8·20 per cent.	October	21st, 1888	43·30 per cent.
"	29th, "	5·5 "	"	28th, "	27·78 "
May	6th, "	4·11 "	November	4th, "	25·43 "
"	13th, "	8·5 "	"	11th, "	21·72 "
"	20th, "	7·74 "	"	18th, "	16·90 "
"	27th, "	7·79 "	"	25th, "	16·86 "
June	3rd, "	20·42 "	December	2nd, "	18·29 "
"	10th, "	38·82 "	"	9th, "	18·49 "
"	17th, "	37·20 "	"	16th, "	8·05 "
"	24th, "	24·07 "	"	23rd, "	7·02 "
July	1st, "	42·46 "	"	30th, "	7·68 "
"	8th, "	40·91 "	January	6th, 1889	7·79 "
"	15th, "	40·81 "	"	13th, "	7·24 "
"	22nd, "	47·26 "	"	20th, "	7·46 "
"	29th, "	44·90 "	"	27th, "	8·02 "
August	5th, "	45·95 "	February	3rd, "	7·91 "
"	12th, "	45·11 "	"	10th, "	5·52 "
"	19th, "	52·67 "	"	17th, "	6·60 "
"	26th, "	42·31 "	"	24th, "	8·80 "
September	2nd, "	48·97 "	March	3rd, "	8·85 "
"	9th, "	49·43 "	"	10th, "	9·62 "
"	16th, "	46·93 "	"	17th, "	7·51 "
"	23rd, "	31·94 "	"	23rd, "	9·82 "
"	30th, "	44·77 "	"	31st, "	9·40 "
October	14th, "	48·96 "	April	7th, "	22·46 "

On the 23rd April General Graham received telegraphic instructions from the Quartermaster-General to march the 32nd Pioneers from Padong to Gnathong, and, without actually commencing to build, to make arrangements for hutting them on their arrival. Further orders would follow. Orders were accordingly issued for 1-inch planks to be cut and prepared for building. On the 28th the first party of Pioneers, 300 strong, left for Gnathong, and a second party of similar strength on the following day. Instructions to commence hutting the Pioneers were received by General Graham on May 2nd; the accommodation provided was to be as inexpensive as possible. Hutting was, therefore, commenced immediately on the arrival of the respective parties on the site of the old Gurkha lines; the huts were all

completed by the 24th May, except those for the officers and followers, which were expected to be ready in another week. A new guard-room at Gnathong was finished on the 5th May, and two out of three Commissariat huts.

The weather continued to be very unfavourable. Heavy snow falls were reported from Gnathong, and also between Tukola and Nimla, where it was reported to be four feet deep, while, at the less elevated parts, storms of thunder, rain, and hail were prevalent. With the exception of the battery the health of the force continued excellent. The percentage of sick among the former was 13·54 on the 5th May, and Lieutenants Noble and Smallwood, R.A., were reported to be very ill. The percentage of sick amongst the whole force on the same date was—

British Troops	. . . . .	7·22 per cent.
Native „	. . . . .	3·84 „
Mules . . . . .	. . . . .	15·51 „
Followers . . . . .	. . . . .	2·47 „

On the 6th May a case of cholera was reported among the hospital kahars, and the man died of it on the 9th.

*Officers.* Lieutenant Bickford, R.A., orderly officer to General Graham, left Sikkim on the 7th May to join a garrison class at Ranikhet.

Lieutenant Prior, 13th Bengal Infantry, left Padong on 11th May to join the head-quarters of his regiment at Pakyong to take up the duties of adjutant, being relieved by Lieutenant Justice in the duties of Treasure Chest Officer; the latter reaching Padong on the 12th May.

*Men lost.* A patrol of the Connaught Rangers having gone out to visit Jalepla on the 10th, two men of their number were discovered to be missing. Search parties were being daily sent out, and by the 16th the Officer Commanding Gnathong reported that they had been traced from Dichu towards Bhutan territory, but that the search party, consisting of Gurkhas, having consumed all their rations, had been compelled to return. It was not deemed advisable to pursue the search into Bhutan territory, so the matter was reported to the Political Officer, and army head-quarters informed of what had been done.

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On the 14th May General Graham left Padong on a tour of inspection, and arrived the same day at Rhenock ridge, and reached Gnathong on the 18th, where he inspected the new huts of the Pioneers; the following day it hailed and snowed all the morning and the greater part of the afternoon, the country near the fort being covered to the depth of 6". The same day the battery (9-1, Northern Division,

Royal Artillery), agreeably to orders received from the Quartermaster-General, marched from Rhenock ridge to Padong *en route* to Darjeeling. Lieutenants Noble and Smallwood were left behind sick at Rhenock ridge, and Lieutenant Huddleston also sick at Padong. General Graham returned to Padong on the 24th May.

The troops in the force had latterly been employed on road-making, hut-building, and fatigues of various kinds, in addition to drill when the weather permitted. The 13th Bengal Infantry had also been put through a short course of musketry. The weather during the week was damp, showery and foggy, and heavy thunderstorms had occurred almost daily at all posts. Patrols were sent out frequently to visit the Jelap, but nothing unusual was observed there. Lieutenant Huddleston, R.A., died at 9-30 P.M. on 29th May, of remittent fever, and was buried the following day.

On the 30th May a desertion took place from the ranks of the Gurkhas at Rhenock ridge, three men having been discovered to have deserted with their uniforms and blankets. Parties were sent in pursuit, and one man of the three was apprehended on the 4th June at the village of Bhutan near the Teesta; the other two were also there, but succeeded in effecting their escape. The pursuit was continued by a native cavalry officer and two sepoy of the Gurkhas, who succeeded in capturing a second deserter on the 9th June near the Rungpo river. On the same day the Pioneers commenced to lay out a rifle range at Gnathong, which they completed on the 14th. Target practice was therefore carried out, and the men encouraged to engage in match and pool shooting in addition to the annual course. A rifle range had also been constructed at Rungpo for the use of the detachment, 13th Bengal Infantry, at that place, and musketry was also carried out by the detachment of the same regiment at Gantok. Mr. Hare, telegraph officer with the force, was at this period recalled, and his place filled up by Mr. Barker, C.I.E., Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, who arrived at Padong for duty on 10th June 1889.

On the 19th June General Graham issued orders for the Padong detachment, 32nd Pioneers, to be relieved by one of similar strength from the head-quarters of the regiment at Gnathong, as he considered the change necessary for the good of their health. The relief was to be carried out in two parties, and in such a manner that the day on which the relieving party marched out of Gnathong the Padong detachment of a similar strength should march in. The first party of  
*1 Subadar, 70 rank and file.* Pioneers, strength as per margin, left Padong  
 on the 23rd June for Rhenock ridge *en route* to Gnathong, where they arrived on the 26th, and the relieved party of similar strength reached Padong on the 29th.



The second party of Pioneers of similar strength left Padong the following day for Gnathong, and the second relieved party of similar strength reached Padong on the 7th July. The weather still continued to be very wet and foggy, and the troops when practicable had been employed in fatigue duties and route-marching. A few parades had taken place. The health of troops continued good, the percentage of sick for the week ending June 30th being—

British Troops	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.98 per cent.
Native "	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.12 "
Followers	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.74 "
Mules	.	.	.	.	.	.	15.12 "

On the 3rd July another case of cholera appeared among the public followers of the Pioneers, and on the 6th three cases appeared among the coolies at Jeluk. All necessary precautions were taken and communication ordered to be restricted as much as possible. On the same day a sepoy of the Gurkhas was also attacked with cholera at Jeluk. Orders were therefore issued for the guard to vacate the block-house and move into camp, and for the coolie huts at that place to be burnt. Sickness had been prevalent latterly amongst the Bhutias in the neighbourhood which was supposed to be cholera ; but, as far as they were concerned, that had not been verified by any medical authority. On the 7th another case was reported at Rhenock ridge among the relieved Rongli guard of the 2-1st Gurkhas. The case among the coolies reported on the 3rd instant had practically recovered by the 7th, but the three men who were seized with cholera on the 6th, and the sepoy, 2-1st Gurkhas, all died. The commissariat coolies were all moved from Jeluk and segregated. In consequence, doubtless, of the timely precautions adopted by General Graham to arrest the spread of cholera, sickness among the Gurkhas at Jeluk had disappeared by the 14th July and very little remained among the coolies.

On the 10th July General Graham left Padong for Gnathong preparatory to removing the head-quarters of the force to the latter place. The day was fine, but the heat he describes as intense, especially in the valleys. He reached Gnathong on the 12th ; this day was also fine, and there was every appearance of a break in the rains. A party of 50 Pioneers visited the Jelap on the same day, but nothing unusual was observed. No cases of cholera occurred at any of the other posts during the week, and the case among the Gurkhas reported at Rhenock ridge on the 7th had practically recovered. The weather during the last week in Sikkim had been much finer and the rainfall lighter. The latter part of the week had been unusually fine at all posts, but below Sedongchen it was close and muggy.

As an experimental measure General Graham had given orders for the withdrawal of escorts accompanying the mails between Gnathong and Rongli, as it might have been necessary to vacate the block-houses on the line owing to sickness, and sepoys for escort duty would not have been then available. But he was obliged to cancel this order, as the discontinuance of the escorts was found to be impracticable with the efficient working of the postal system generally. Another commissariat coolie died at Jeluk on the 13th instant from cholera, and another man who was seized with it on the 11th recovered. No fresh cases having occurred, orders were issued to disinfect the Jeluk block-house prior to its being reoccupied by the Gurkha guard, for the Gurkha cholera camp near Lingtu to be struck, and for the old guard of the Gurkhas, retained at Jeluk when the cholera broke out, to return to regimental head-quarters at Rhenock ridge.

On the 28th July the Raja and Rani of Sikkim moved into camp from Gantok to a place near the village of Linduk on the Tumlong road, and their escort, on the suggestion of the Political Officer, was then withdrawn. But on the 31st July the Officer Commanding Gantok reported that the Rani had absconded from Camp Nabe near Penlong La for Chumbi the previous evening, accompanied by a few followers. At the request of the Assistant Political Officer a party of one non-commissioned officer and seven sepoys was detached from Rungpo towards the Chola to try and intercept her, and a similar party with three days rations was detached from Gantok *via* Lagyap for the same purpose. The same afternoon the Raja was brought back under escort from his camp and lodged in the palace at Gantok under a guard.

These two parties returned on the 5th August, reporting that the Rani and followers had crossed the Chola the same day as they started, and that bearers and coolies had come over from Chumbi as far as Chomnago to meet the party. The weather still continued wet and foggy, and the troops were being exercised in route-marching, drills, fatigues, and musketry; their health remained good, the percentage of sick for the week ending 4th August being—

British Troops	.	.	.	.	.	.	2'48 per cent.
Native „	.	.	.	.	.	.	1'50 „
Followers	.	.	.	.	.	.	3'37 „
Mules	.	.	.	.	.	.	10'89 „